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Abstract 
 
JAN ROVNY: Struggle Over Dimensionality: Party Competition in Europe. 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
This work studies political issues and political competition. Political issues -- contestable 
concerns within the public sphere -- are multiple and infinitesimal, as people understand 
them in different contexts and at different levels. To become comprehensible and 
debatable political demands, individual preferences must be simplified into issue bundles 
or `issue dimensions'. The key actors in this process are political parties that use strategic 
calculus to join disparate political preferences into ideological platforms. This 
dissertation examines the considerations and constraints that figure in this partisan 
calculus. The dynamic that arises is one in which politics is not so much a contest over 
positioning on issues, as conceived by classical spatial theory, but rather a competition 
over the content and structure of these issues. Politics is a struggle over the dimensional 
composition of political issues. 
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Introduction 
 
In order to study the laws of history we must … turn to the homogeneous, 
infinitesimal elements that move the masses to action. 
         Leo Tolstoy1 
 
 
This work studies political issues and political competition. Political issues -- contestable 
concerns within the public sphere -- are multiple and infinitesimal, as people understand 
them in different contexts and at different levels. To become comprehensible and 
debatable political demands, individual preferences must be simplified into issue bundles 
or `issue dimensions'. The translation of political elements into coherent value-packages, 
capable of moving masses into action, is at the heart of political competition. When and 
how this is done -- and cui bono -- is the topic of this dissertation.  
 
The key actors in this process are political parties that use strategic calculus to join 
disparate political preferences into ideological platforms. This dissertation examines the 
considerations and constraints that figure in this partisan calculus. The three papers that 
constitute this dissertation examine the interaction between party strategy and the 
dimensional structure of political competition. They theorize the conditions under which 
political parties seek to alter the dimensionality of political competition through their 
manipulation of the salience of issues and their positioning on these issues. The dynamic 
that arises is one in which politics is not so much a contest over positioning on issues, as 
conceived by classical spatial theory, but rather a competition over the content and 
                                                
1 War and Peace, Volume III, Part III, Chapter 1, Penguin Classics 2005: 914 
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structure of these issues. Politics is a struggle over the dimensional composition of 
political issues. 
 
The first paper, ``Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs?,'' notes that the partisan strategy of 
presenting ambiguous positions is considered costly by literature on party competition. 
This literature, however, does not consider party strategies in the context of multiple 
issue dimensions. Yet multidimensionality is likely to play an important role in partisan 
strategic calculus. While it may be rational for a party to emphasize a certain issue 
dimension and unequivocally advertise its position on it, it may be equally rational and 
rewarding to disguise its stance on another dimension by blurring its positioning. Who 
emphasizes issue positions and who blurs them may thus crucially depend on the 
dimensional context. This paper addresses party strategies in multiple issue dimensions. 
It argues that party strategies are determined by partisan attachment to different political 
issues, which implies that different political parties have varying interests in issue 
dimensions. Consequently parties employ the strategies of issue emphasis and position 
blurring in various dimensional context. Who emphasizes and who blurs thus depends on 
the actors’ relative stakes in different issue dimensions. The paper makes its case by 
performing cross-sectional analyses of 132 political parties in 14 Western European party 
systems. It utilizes data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the 2006 Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey. 
 
The second paper, ``Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand?,'' applies the above argument 
to the radical right party family. It questions the utility of assessing radical right party 
 3 
placement on economic issues, which has been extensively analyzed in academic 
literature. Starting from the premise that political parties have varying strategic stakes in 
different political issues, the paper considers political competition in multiple issue 
dimensions. It suggests that political competition is not simply a matter of taking 
positions on political issues, but rather centers on the manipulation of the dimensional 
structure of politics. The core argument is that certain political parties, such as the radical 
right, seek to compete on neglected, secondary issues in the party system, while 
simultaneously blurring their positions on established issues in order to attract broader 
support. Deliberate position blurring -- considered costly by the literature -- may thus be 
an effective strategy in multidimensional competition, qualifying the study of party 
placements. The paper combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert 
placement of political parties, and voter preferences, by studying seventeen radical right 
parties in nine Western European party systems. 
 
The third paper, ``Westernization of Political Competition in Eastern Europe,'' examines 
the empirical fact that political competition in Eastern Europe is, slowly and unevenly, 
converging on a western pattern. The paper first suggests that the underlying cause of this 
shift is the changing meaning of the non-economic, socio-cultural dimension in Eastern 
Europe. It is no longer dominated by issues of elementary civil liberties and democratic 
rights, which were paramount during democratic transition. Instead, the socio-cultural 
dimension is increasingly defined by more typically western concerns over 
cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, and secular modernism versus traditionalism. 
Second, under these new circumstances, political competition in Eastern Europe becomes 
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determined by deeper historical experiences. The paper argues that the historical 
experiences of state and nation building are important factors framing political 
competition in contemporary Eastern Europe. It tests these claims by conducting 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of 14 Eastern European countries. 
 
 
 
 
Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? 
 
Introduction 
 
Literature on party competition extensively considers how various parties choose their 
political issues and their issue positions, and how adopting ambiguous issue positions is 
predominantly a costly strategy. It, however, rarely studies party strategies in reference to 
multiple issue dimensions. Yet multidimensionality is likely to play an important role in 
partisan strategic calculus. While it may be rational for a party to emphasize a certain 
issue dimension and unequivocally advertise its position on it, it may be equally rational 
and rewarding to disguise its stance on another dimension by blurring its positioning. 
Political strategy thus may not only differ across parties, it may also differ across issue 
dimensions. Who emphasizes issue positions and who blurs them may thus crucially 
depend on the dimensional context.      
 
This paper addresses the internal logics of party strategies in multiple issue dimensions. It 
argues that party strategies are determined by partisan attachment to political issues, 
which implies that different political parties have varying interests in issue dimensions. 
Consequently parties employ the strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring in 
various dimensional context. Who emphasizes and who blurs thus depends on the actors’ 
relative stakes in different issue dimensions.  
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The paper operationalizes dimensional attachment as a function of distance from the 
center of a given dimension. Outlying parties are expected to be more invested in the 
issues they stand out on. Consequently, the strategies of issue emphasis and position 
blurring are explained by the relative dimensional positions parties hold. By connecting 
partisan issue positioning, issue salience and positional ambiguity, this work stands at the 
theoretical cross-roads between spatial theory, issue salience theory and directional 
theory.  
 
Additionally, this paper engages the `obfuscation’ literature, studied mainly in the context 
of U.S. politics. This literature argues that ambiguous issue positioning is a costly 
strategy. This paper, however, demonstrates that in multidimensional competition, 
position blurring may be beneficial. Furthermore, this paper comments on niche party 
literature by suggesting that who emphasizes and who blurs does not depend on party 
family, but rather on partisan interest in various issue dimensions. 
 
The paper makes its case by performing cross-sectional analyses of 132 political parties 
in 14 Western European party systems on three major issue dimensions -- economic 
issues, non-economic/social issues, and the issue of European integration. It utilizes data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The 
paper first discusses the literature on party strategies in multidimensional context. 
Second, it addresses the theoretical expectations regarding issue emphasis and position 
blurring. Third, it discusses the data and the operationalization of key concepts. The 
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fourth section presents the analyses and summarizes the results, while the final section 
serves as a conclusion.  
 
Party Strategies in Multidimensional Context 
 
The most broadly analyzed party strategy is position-taking, formalized by spatial theory 
(Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957). Parties respond to voters' ideal preference points, and  
position themselves on continuous issue scales, simplified into issue dimensions. 
Originally, spatial competition was conceptualized in a single dimension. Later models 
have relaxed the assumption of uni-dimensionality; their aim, however, was only to test 
whether and under what conditions equilibrium solutions hold in multiple dimensions 
(McKelvey 1976; Chappell and Keetch 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1989; Schofield 1993). 
For spatial theory, the dimensional structure and the salience of the various dimensions is 
an assumed context within which competition occurs. Consequently, the spatial tradition 
sees competition as a contest over party positioning with respect to voters, who minimize 
the aggregate distance between themselves and the party they vote for in n-dimensional 
space.   
 
Some parties, however, may be more advantaged or competent on some political issues 
rather than others, and consequently seek to shift political focus toward their strengths. 
Issue ownership theory and saliency theory suggest that parties do not merely respond to 
voter preferences, but that they affect vote choice through their actions in political 
campaigns (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Petrocik 1996). Another party 
strategy is thus to increase the salience of those political issues on which a party holds an 
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advantaged position, or on which it has better credentials. Inversely, parties ignore or try 
to mute those issues which do not benefit them.   
 
This is consistent with spatial theory, although altering issue salience amounts to 
changing the structure of political competition. By emphasizing one issue over others, 
political parties increase the dominance of one scale over others, making the spatial 
distances on this scale more important determinants of vote choice.2 This is very much in 
line with Riker’s heresthetics where parties tactically shift dimensional salience to issue 
scales where they attract greater proportion of voters (1986).   
 
The logical corollary to position taking is position avoiding, or position blurring. Rather 
than taking a clear position on an issue, parties may strive to either not be associated with 
any position on this issue, or to present a mixture of positions.  
 
Position blurring has received considerable attention in the American politics literature 
under the label of `obfuscation’ or `ambiguity’.3 It has, however, been studied exclusively 
in uni-dimensional contexts, common to formal theories simplifying the political world to 
one theoretical dimension.  
 
In the uni-dimensional context of American politics, the strategy of position blurring or 
obfuscation has been seen as disadvantageous to political parties or candidates. The 
                                                
2 I am grateful to George Rabinowitz for this insight. Formally this amounts to multiplying the different 
scales by different weight coefficients. 
 
3 I use the terms blurring, obfuscation and ambiguity of positioning interchangeably. I prefer the term 
blurring due to its more common usage. 
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literature generally agrees with Alvarez that ``the more uncertain a voter is about 
candidate positions, the less likely she is to support the candidate”(1998: 204). 
Consequently, the winning strategy is to clarify issue positions.  
 
Earlier works conclude similarly on both formal and empirical grounds. Shepsle (1972) 
demonstrates that ambiguity decreases the appeal of a candidate. An equivocal candidate 
is positively disadvantaged, and this holds as long as only a majority of voters are risk-
averse. Similarly, Enelow and Hinich (1981) develop a formal model showing that voters 
move away from the position where there is greater positional variance (i.e. where there 
is uncertainty). Bartels (1986) empirically applies the Enelow and Hinich model, 
illustrating that voter uncertainty is detrimental to candidates and that this detriment is 
comparably strong to voter-candidate issue distance. Gill (2005) reports similar findings 
using a different measure of uncertainty. This suggests that position blurring may deter 
voters as acutely as spatial distance.  
 
Moreover, the `obfuscation’ literature frequently presents position blurring as primarily a 
structural factor. Alvarez stresses that uncertainty varies across candidates as a function 
of incumbency, previous experience and national prominence, and that uncertainty 
generally diminishes across the course of campaigns in response to issue and substantive 
information (1998: 204). This suggests that uncertainty is a characteristic, rather than a 
strategy. It is less a subject of candidate or party agency, but rather an exogenous context 
which can change only slowly and almost independently from the candidate or the party. 
An alternate view is that of Franklin (1991), who underlines how political institutions are 
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insufficient tools in providing clear messages to the electorate. He finds that candidates 
can affect the clarity of their perceived positions through their campaign strategies. 
Clarity, nonetheless, remains the strategic aim. 
 
In the U.S. context, analysts logically consider candidate, rather than party strategies. 
Theoretically, however, position blurring can be carried out by either agent. Candidates, 
as well as parties, may choose to strategically blur their stances on certain issues. 
Moreover, deliberate position blurring may be even easier for individual candidates than 
for political parties, since many of the latter have extensive histories and established 
records -- often beyond an individuals' lifetime. On the other hand, political parties may 
consist of various internal factions which hold somewhat different positions on the same 
issues. Position blurring may thus result from internal party divisions. The extent to 
which position blurring is a deliberate party strategy or a result of unintended internal 
tensions is difficult to parse out without adequate data on party unity.  
 
The party strategic literature has underemphasized the fact that political competition is 
not merely a struggle over where a party stands. Once issue salience is taken into 
account, political competition becomes a contest over which issues prevail in political 
discourse and voter decision-making. The work of Carmines and Stimson (1989) and 
Stimson (2004) highlights the importance of considering the dimensional structure of 
political competition when studying party strategies. The authors demonstrate that the 
structure of political competition is itself the subject of political strategizing. Parties do 
not merely respond to voter preference distributions. They shape the importance of these 
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distributions by emphasizing or muting various political topics. They reshape political 
competition by raising new political issues which do not neatly fold into the standing 
dimensional structure, creating new dimensions of competition. Once party strategies are 
considered in this dimensional context -- in the context of party competition played out 
over a number of  issue dimensions which may be independent -- the strategy of issue 
emphasis becomes crucial and the strategy of position blurring becomes viable.  
 
Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? 
 
The core argument of this paper is that, given their histories, social followings, 
ideological outlooks and varying institutional entrenchment, political parties are invested 
in different issue dimensions. This investment importantly determines their strategies. On 
the one hand, parties emphasize the issue dimensions on which they hold intense -- i.e. 
outstanding -- positions. On the other hand, parties blur their positions on issue 
dimensions which are secondary to them, on which they do not take outstanding 
positions.  
 
To attract attention to their preferred issue dimension, parties emphasize the given issues 
by increasing their salience and by taking distinctive, outlying positions on them. A party 
seeking to highlight the merits of a dimension and subsequently its credentials on it, is 
likely to take visible positions away from the dimension's center. Highlighting an issue 
dimension is unlikely to succeed by proposing a moderate stance, since a radical, 
outlying position is more distinguishable and captivating.  
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On the contrary, parties may be disadvantaged on some issue dimensions, either because 
they have poor reputation on these issues; they hold unpopular positions; they are 
crowded by other proximate parties on these issues; or their core constituencies are 
divided over them. Under such conditions it is rational for parties to deemphasize these 
issues and strategically blur their positions on them. Position blurring may take the form 
of either avoiding to present any position on a given dimension, or of presenting a 
multiplicity of positions. Such strategy is rational because it allows a party to stand out on 
its preferred dimension, while being able to either not deter voters (no position is 
presented), or attract broader voter coalitions (multiple positions are presented) on other 
dimensions. 
 
Consider a political party which has an intense, outlying position on issue dimension A. 
Assume further that this party has poor reputation on and a potentially divided 
constituency over issue dimension B. The party will logically emphasize issue dimension 
A. However, on dimension B, the party faces a dilemma. If it adopts and communicates a 
position on this dimension, it risks increasing the salience of issue dimension B, and faces 
potential defection from those members of the constituency who find themselves far 
away from the party’s position. A rational strategy for this party would thus be to 
compete on issue dimension A with an unambiguous, and emphasized position, while 
muting issues connected with dimension B and blurring its positioning on them. This 
blurring may entail avoiding taking any position on dimension B, or -- if pressed -- the 
party leaders may present varying positions, depending on their audience.  
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This is a rather different conclusion from that of the `obfuscation’ literature. Shepsle 
(1972: 567), searching for the conditions under which position ambiguity is 
advantageous, finds that deliberate position blurring may be a winning strategy only 
when majority of voters are risk-acceptant, and possess intense preferences over an issue, 
thus rendering it `critical’. My argument, which considers multi-dimensional competition, 
is the opposite. The strategy of position blurring is adopted on those dimensions which 
are less salient to a given party. Blurring on secondary dimensions exploits the 
opportunity of attracting (or at least not deterring) broader voter groups.  
 
By theorizing a connection between issue positioning and issue salience, my argument 
presents a middle ground between spatial and directional theory. In their seminal article 
introducing directional theory, Rabinowitz and MacDonald stress the idea that political 
actors emphasize a set of issues by taking `intense' positions on them: 
  
``By taking clear, strong stands, candidates [or parties] can make an issue central to 
judgements about themselves. At the same time candidates [or parties] who can 
successfully evade an issue are able to make that issue far less relevant for 
judgements about themselves. Thus in a multiissue election candidates [or parties] 
are likely to be intense on issues that benefit them and silent on issues that are 
potentially damaging" (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989: 98-9). 
 
 
This paper understands `intensity' both in the sense of salience, as well as outlying 
positioning. A `clear, strong stance' on the part of a political actor is understood to entail 
a strong emphasis on the issue, together with taking a distinctive position away from the 
center of the issue. 
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Consequently, parties adopting intense, extreme positions on one dimension are likely to 
prefer competing on this dimension. They are historically or ideologically invested in this 
dimension, and thus are likely to emphasize the political issues associated with this 
dimension. On the other hand, these parties are likely to find other dimensions less useful 
for their competitive aims. They are thus likely to deemphasize these dimensions and blur 
their positions on them. This leads to two hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The more extremely placed on one dimension, the more likely a party 
emphasizes its position on this dimension and deemphasizes its position on another 
dimension. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more extremely placed on one dimension, the more likely a party 
presents a clear position on this dimension and blurs its position on another dimension. 
 
Put another way, the more extremely placed a party is on a given dimension, the more 
likely it emphasizes this dimension, and the less likely it blurs its position on it. These 
hypotheses consequently point to a curvilinear relationship between position and issue 
salience on the one hand, and position and position blurring on the other. 
 
Historical or ideological investment in different issues, however, is not the only 
determinant of partisan tactics. Participation in government is an important conditioning 
factor on party strategy. First, parties which have been in government become somewhat 
constrained in their strategic employment of salience and blurring. While in office, their 
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representatives are likely to take positions on multiple issues, and these positions are 
more visible, due to their governmental profile. This establishes a clearer positional 
reputation of the party, and blurring  becomes an improbable strategy. The strategy of 
deemphasizing and blurring economic issues is likely to be particularly limited by 
government participation. This is because economic issues tend to be the dominant 
concerns of mainstream party competition4, and every government faces and becomes 
responsible for concrete economic decisions. Second, parties which aspire to join 
government coalitions are likely to be circumscribed in their capacity to emphasize odd -- 
usually non-economic -- issues, which risk driving a wedge between the coalition 
partners. In short, government participation likely limits position blurring, particularly on 
economic issues, and shifts issue salience toward economic, rather than non-economic 
issues.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Government participation increases party emphasis on economic issues and 
decreases party emphasis on non-economic issues. 
 
Various kinds of parties may employ the strategies of salience and blurring, according to 
their relative dimensional stakes. This theoretical account does not rely on any party 
typology. It simply sees party strategies as a function of their relative dimensional 
investment, where a clear indicator of preferring a dimension is holding an intense, 
visible position away from the center. Parties preferring competition on one dimension 
emphasize this dimension, while blurring their positions on other dimensions.  
 
                                                
4 See Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
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This argument complements the literature on issue entrepreneurship discussed by Hobolt 
and DeVries (2011). Issue entrepreneurs, who tend to emphasize and take outstanding 
positions on the issues they champion, are expected to blur their positions on mainstream 
issues.  
 
On the other hand, this argument contrasts with niche party literature, which underlines 
the strategic particularity of small, marginal parties seeking to highlight new or 
resuscitated political issues (Meguid 2005, 2008; Rovny and Edwards forthcoming). 
While this literature provides a theoretical definition of niche parties, it invariably 
operationalizes them as radical right, green, radical left and occasionally ethnic and 
regional parties (ibid.; Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008). This combines parties which are 
likely to differ significantly in their dimensional outlooks and consequently in their 
strategies. Radical left parties, for example, are likely to contest redistributive issues, 
while radical right parties concentrate on issues of immigration and national identity. 
Furthermore, niche party literature omits various other parties, such as liberal or Christian 
democratic parties, which may be equally likely to attempt shifting political salience to 
their preferred issue dimensions, while blurring their positions on other dimensions.  
 
The niche party literature, concentrating on electorally marginal parties, effectively 
provides an alternative explanation, suggesting that issue salience and position blurring 
are a function of party size. The argument suggests that as small parties with limited 
prospects of electoral success in competition with the entrenched political establishment, 
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niche parties seek to emphasize new or insignificant issues, while potentially blurring 
their positions elsewhere. Party size is thus a relevant control variable in this analysis.  
 
Finally, electoral systems, which aid or hinder minor competitors in gaining 
representation are an important control variable. In addition, average levels of issue 
salience at the country level are used to control for system-specific characteristics.  
  
Data and Measurement 
 
This section addresses the data, conceptualization and tests the hypotheses developed in 
the previous sections. It proceeds in three steps. It first discusses the data and the 
operationalization of the key concepts. Second, it describes the political space of party 
competition and demonstrates which parties emphasize and which parties blur using 
descriptive statistics. Finally it tests the hypotheses concerning issue salience, position 
blurring and government participation using regression analyses.  
 
This paper limits itself to cross-sectional study of West European party systems in the 
early 2000s. The ideal dataset for testing the above theory is the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES) which measures party positions on economic issues, non-economic or 
social issues and on European integration (Hooghe et al. 2010). The dataset covers 132 
political parties in 14 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden.  
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The paper follows the recommendations of Benoit and Laver (2011) and Rovny and 
Marks (2011) by conducting its analyses using three deductively derived issue 
dimensions. These dimensions are 1) the economic dimension, 2) the non-
economic/social dimension5, and 3) European integration. Although these dimensions are 
in no way exhaustive of the complex concerns faced by advanced industrial societies, 
they are sufficient to capture the strategic dynamics of issue emphasis and position 
blurring. Furthermore, these dimensions capture core political conflicts in Western 
Europe (Kitschelt 1992; Laver and Hunt 1992; Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Kitschelt 2004; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi et. al. 2008). 
 
The measure of economic and non-economic issue salience is taken from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset, which codes quasi sentences of party 
manifestos as belonging to one of 56 issue categories (Budge et al. 2001). Salience of an 
issue dimension is thus measured as the sum of proportions of quasi sentences pertaining 
to issues belonging to the given dimension. For details on which issues are considered a 
part of which dimension, please see Appendix A. The measure of EU salience is taken 
from the CHES dataset, where it is measured with a direct question on a 4-point scale.  
 
The most difficult concept to operationalize is position blurring. For lack of a direct 
measure, this concept is assess using the standard deviation of expert judgement on party 
placement. The measure takes advantage of the CHES dataset, which provides measures 
                                                
5 The non-economic/social dimension is described by Kitschelt (1994: 9,12) as a communitarian dimension 
of politics, contrasting self-organized community values with paternalism. Marks et al. (2006) call this 
dimension gal-tan, juxtaposing `green, alternative, libertarian’ values with `traditionalist, authoritarian and 
nationalist' outlooks. 
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on both expert positioning of political parties on different issues and issue dimensions, 
but also expert uncertainty over this positioning in the form of expert standard deviations.  
 
This operationalization is far from ideal because clearly expert standard deviations 
capture more than position blurring. First, expert standard deviations tap expert (lack of) 
knowledge of certain parties. This lack of knowledge is likely to be related to party vote 
share, since experts know large party positions better (Marks  et al. 2007). If this were the 
case, small parties should receive uniformly higher scores on blurring. Expert lack of 
knowledge is also likely to be related to the salience of the dimension evaluated, as 
experts tend to know party positions on highly salient dimensions better. To alleviate this 
concern, the statistical models control for the party system level salience of the evaluated 
issue dimension.  
 
Second, expert standard deviations may also capture intra-party dissent. Where parties 
are divided, they may project multiple positions and experts may thus disagree on their 
placement. Ideally, it would be possible to control for party dissent on all of the three 
dimensions addressed in this paper. Unfortunately, the CHES dataset includes a measure 
on party dissent only for the European integration dimension and not for the other two.  
 
Analysis and Results 
 
The theoretical framework stresses that the employment of particular strategies depends 
primarily on party placement. Parties farther from the center of a dimension tend to 
emphasize this dimension, while blurring their position on the others.  
 20 
Figure 1 Issue Salience 
 
Outliers are most extremely placed 30% of parties on each dimension (15% on each end). 
Economic and Non-Economic salience measured as % of party manifesto (CMP data) 
EU salience measured by CHES 2006, transformed to range from 0-100.  
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Figure 2 Position Blurring 
Outliers are most extremely placed 30% of parties on each dimension (15% on each end). CHES 2006 
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Figures 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics concerning issue emphasis and position 
blurring depending on the dimensional position of parties. For demonstrative purposes, 
these figures define parties as outliers when they belong to the most extremely placed 
30% of parties (15% on each end) on each dimension, while mainstream parties are those 
that do not stand out on any dimension. Figure 1 shows the extent to which parties 
emphasize economic, non-economic and European issues. As expected, economic 
outliers concentrate on economic issues, non-economic outliers overemphasize non-
economic and EU issues, while EU outliers greatly stress EU issues. Similarly, figure 2 
demonstrates position blurring, supporting my theoretical claims. Economic outliers tend 
to extensively blur their non-economic positions, while non-economic outliers blur their 
economic stances. Outliers on EU integration slightly blur the other two dimensions 
while presenting vary clear positions on the EU.  
 
Turning from descriptive to inferential statistical analysis, table 1 presents six OLS 
regression models assessing party strategies of issue salience and position blurring. It 
uses combined party-level data from the CHES and CMP datasets. The first three models 
predict position blurring on the three dimensions, measured as standard deviations of 
expert placements in the CHES dataset. The last three models predict salience of the three 
issue dimensions. Issue salience of economic and non-economic issues is measured as the 
proportion of quasi-sentences in party manifestos from the CMP dataset, while issue 
salience of the EU is measured with a direct question in CHES 2006. All models use 
robust standard errors clustered by country, in order to eliminate country clustering 
effects.  
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The theory suggests that issue salience and position blurring are a curvilinear function of 
party positioning. Consequently, the key predictors in the models are position and 
position-squared on each dimension, as measured by CHES 2006. Furthermore, 
government participation is measured as the number of months a party spent in 
government since 1990. The rationale behind this measure is to capture not just 
temporary presence in government in 2006, but rather the partisan characteristic of being 
a major party or a governing coalition partner with routine aim and expectation of 
entering government. Vote percentage measures the vote share each party received in the 
most recent election prior to 2006. Average electoral district magnitude is an institutional 
variable capturing the proportionality of the electoral system. The measure is taken from 
Johnson and Wallack (2010). Finally, to control for the salience levels of given 
dimensions, average party system salience -- measured as the average salience of the 
given dimension in each party system -- is included in the models. In addition, the models 
predicting EU salience and blurring further control for intra-party dissent on the EU, as 
measured by a direct question in CHES 2006.
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 Table 1 Effects of Position on Blurring and Salience  
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Figure 3 Effects of Position on Blurring and Salience 
 
Based on results in table 1 
Effect of issue position on position blurring and issue salience, while all other predictors held at their mean. 
EU position is 0-7 scale and EU salience is 0-4 scale  
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The results presented in table 1 support my theoretical expectations. To better illustrate 
the major findings, figure 3 summarizes some key results graphically. The top three 
panels of figure 3 depict the effect of issue positioning on position blurring, while other 
predictors are held at their mean.6 
 
The first panel demonstrates that economic position blurring is increasingly performed by 
parties positioned at the extremes of the non-economic dimension, while parties at the 
extremes of the economic dimension present clear economic positions. The reverse is true 
for non-economic position blurring. Panel 2 of figure 3 shows that non-economic position 
blurring is enacted by parties standing towards the extremes of the economic dimension, 
while parties at the extremes of the non-economic dimension present clear positions on it. 
Finally, as seen in panel 3 of figure 3, EU position blurring is carried out by non-
economic outliers, while outliers on the EU present clear positions.  
                                                
6 As Stimson et al. (2011) observe in the French case, economic and non-economic party positions are 
correlated (r=0.576). Similarly, the square terms are correlated with the linear predictor. Consequently, to 
better test the statistical significance of positional effects in the models in table 1, I carry out a number of 
joint F-tests:  
Model 1 
Ho: economic position = economic position2 = 
 non-economic position = non-economic position2 = 0, F(4,13)=10.40, p<0.001 
Model 2  
Ho: economic position = economic position2 =  
non-economic position = non-economic position2 = 0, F(4,13)=12.28, p<0.000 
Model 3  
Ho: non-economic position = non-economic position2 = EU position = EU position2 = 0, F(4,13)=49.18, 
p<0.000 
Model 4 
Ho: economic position = economic position2 = 
 non-economic position = non-economic position2 = 0, F(4,13)=6.65, p<0.004 
Model 5  
Ho: economic position = economic position2 =  
non-economic position = non-economic position2 = 0, F(4,13)=6.54, p<0.004 
Model 6  
Ho: EU position = EU position2 = 0, F(2,13)=14.45, p<0.001 
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These results reject the speculation that experts simply do not know as much about small, 
fringe parties, and that the dependent variables of expert uncertainty thus merely tap their 
(lack of) knowledge, rather than party strategies. First, the models control for vote share. 
Second, experts demonstrate greater certainty about economic positions of economic 
fringe parties, and about non-economic positions of non-economic fringe parties. 
Simultaneously, they are significantly less certain about the economic positions of the 
non-economic outliers, as well as about the non-economic positions of economic outliers.  
This discrepancy cannot be simply attributed to expert lack of knowledge of small, fringe 
parties. Similarly, these results remain significant when controlling for mean national 
economic, non-economic and EU salience; as well as intra-party dissent on the EU. This 
further suggests that partisan strategizing -- position blurring -- is considerably reflected 
in expert placement standard deviations.  
 
Issue salience is another strategy employed by political parties. The bottom three panels 
of figure 3 illustrate the effects of issue position on issue salience, while other predictors 
are held at their mean. As expected, parties on the fringes of the economic dimension 
emphasize economic issues, while outliers on non-economic issues tend to deemphasize 
them (panel 4). On the contrary, parties on the extremes of the non-economic dimension 
tend to emphasize non-economic issues, while parties on the extremes of the economic 
dimension deemphasize them (panel 5). Finally, parties which are on the extremes of the 
EU dimension emphasize EU issues (panel 6).  
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In addition to party strategies, government participation also affects issue salience. Model 
5 in  table 1 indicates that participation in government significantly decreases party 
emphasis on non-economic issues. Although the effect of government participation on 
economic salience is in the hypothesized direction, it just passes below the acceptable 
threshold of statistical significance (model 4). As suggested by the theoretical framework, 
governing parties are inhibited from politicizing alternative, non-economic issues. As 
members of the executive charged with economic management, they must rather take 
responsibility for explicit economic decisions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that the choice of party strategy is determined by varying partisan 
involvement in political issue dimensions. The well studied fact that political parties are 
endowed with varying core constituencies, ideological heritages and organizational 
structures has an important implication. Given these characteristics, specific parties are 
invested in different issue dimensions. Some parties are better placed to compete 
primarily over economic issues, some over non-economic issues, others over EU issues 
or a combination of the three. These relative stakes in different issue dimensions 
determine the choice of partisan strategies.  
 
Consequently, parties employ the strategies of issue emphasis and position blurring in 
various dimensional contexts. The primary indicator of issue emphasis and position 
blurring is the intensity with which parties contest a given dimension. Political parties 
which stand farther from the center of a particular dimension tend to emphasize that 
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dimension. It is, after all, a dimension on which they hold an outstanding position. On the 
contrary, on the dimensions where parties do not take eccentric positions, where they 
tend to be less advantaged, they tend to blur their stances. This dynamic holds across 
multiple party families, including those not considered marginal, niche parties.    
 
Most importantly, this paper demonstrates that the strategy of position blurring or 
`obfuscation’ can be rewarding -- contrary to the claims of vast majority of the literature.  
When considering multidimensional political competition, political parties have an 
incentive to equivocate their positions on dimensions on which they are somehow 
disadvantaged: where they hold unpopular positions; where they are crowded by their 
competitors; where they have bad reputation; or where their core constituencies are 
divided. Projecting ambiguous positions or no positions at all on these dimensions can be 
advantageous because it can attract voters with varying stances, or at least not deter them. 
Position blurring thus is a rewarding strategy, if applied on the appropriate issue 
dimension.  
 
This finding is consistent with the spatial paradigm. It highlights the utility of mapping 
positions of political actors in n-dimensional space. It is, however, inconsistent with 
spatial theory, which suggests that political actors compete through position taking. On 
the contrary, this paper theorizes and demonstrates the utility of political competition 
through position non-taking, or position blurring.  
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Finally, this paper outlines how strategic political actions are directed at the reframing of 
political competition. To be sure, party leaders are concerned with concrete political 
issues. In the aggregate, however, their actions lead to systemic change. Emphasizing 
particular policy issues aims at increasing their prominence in political competition, 
while blurring positions on specific issues seeks to disguise their relevance in political 
decision-making. Since, as argued in this paper, party strategies follow different stakes in 
different issue dimensions, it is the structure of political competition which is the central 
subject of political contest.  
 
 
 
 
Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand? 
 
Introduction 
 
Today's radical right is said to be `right-wing' due to its nationalistic, authoritative, anti-
cosmopolitan and especially anti-immigrant views. The economic placement of the 
radical right is, however, debated. While earlier works point to neo-liberal stances of 
radical right parties, studies of the social bases of these parties point to significant support 
from traditionally left-leaning constituencies. Recent scholarship argues that radical right 
parties abandoned their outlying economic positions and shifted closer toward the 
economic center.  
 
This article, however, questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on 
economic issues. It suggests that politics is a larger struggle over the issue content of 
political competition. Political parties are invested in different issue dimensions, and thus 
prefer competing on some issues over others. Consequently, parties emphasize their 
stance on some issue dimensions, while strategically evading positioning on others, in 
order to mask the spatial distances between themselves and their voters. This article 
argues that parties, such as the radical right, may successfully adopt a strategy of 
deliberate position blurring. In light of such competition, taking a position may be neither 
an appropriate party strategy, nor an adequate academic expectation.  
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This argument underlines the limits of spatial theory in capturing party competition. 
While spatial theory conceptualizes political competition as position taking, this article 
underlines the strategic utility of position avoiding or position blurring. This dimensional 
approach to political competition considers issue positioning, issue salience, and strategic 
positional avoidance in multidimensional context. This approach explains the apparent 
variance of radical right economic placement as an outcome of these parties' conscious 
dimensional strategizing -- of deliberate position blurring.  
 
This article combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of 
political parties and voter preferences based on multiple public opinion surveys. It 
considers seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems. The 
article first reviews the literature on radical right ideological placement. The second 
section introduces a dimensional approach to party competition, detailing general party 
strategies in multidimensional context, while generating specific hypotheses about the 
radical right. The third section discusses the data and operationalization. The fourth 
section presents the analyses and results, while the final section serves as a conclusion.  
 
Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand? 
 
Scholarship on radical right parties agrees on a large set of their ideological 
characteristics. It suggests that radical right parties rely on emotive appeals to national 
sentiments defined in ethnic terms; reject cosmopolitan conceptions of society; react to 
rising non-European immigration; oppose globalization and reject European integration 
which they see as undermining national sovereignty and identity; and brand themselves 
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as anti-parties, criticizing domestic political elites as corrupt and removed from the 
`common people.'7 Rydgren (2005) argues that the rise and success of the radical right is 
associated with the development and diffusion of effective ideological `master frames.' 
The frame, pioneered by the French Front National in the 1970s and 80s, combines 
ethno-nationalism and populist anti-establishment rhetoric, without being overtly racist or 
anti-democratic. It infuses the previously marginalized radical right with a potent 
ideological model, allowing it to ``free itself from enough stigma to be able to attract 
[new] voters" (ibid.: 416). 
 
This frame, however, says little about radical right economic positions. The rise of radical 
right parties in Western Europe is associated with a backlash against the `excessive role 
of the state' in the economy, and the power of labour unions (Ignazi 2003). Earlier 
literature suggests that radical right parties present a ``classical liberal position on the 
individual and the economy"(Betz 1994: 4). Kitschelt and McGann suggest that the 
radical right must adopt a `winning formula' consisting of authoritarian and nationalistic 
social appeal coupled with extreme neo-liberalism, ``calling for the dismantling of public 
bureaucracies and the welfare state," demanding a ``strong and authoritarian, but small" 
state (1995: 19-20, McGann & Kitschelt 2005).  
 
Recent literature considering the social bases of radical right support, however, 
underscores the cross-class character of radical right voters. Evans (2005) finds that 
radical right parties attract both self-employed, as well as manual workers, and that 
                                                
7 See Betz 1994; Taggart 1995; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 1996; Hainsworth 2000; Hooghe et al. 
2002; Hainsworth 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008. 
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continental radical right parties also increasingly attract routine non-manual workers, 
further diversifying the radical right class base (ibid.: 92). Ivarsflaten (2005) 
demonstrates that the self-employed and manual worker supporters of the radical right 
hold significantly different views on the economy, pointing to the radical right 
``electorates’ deep division over taxes, welfare provisions and the desirable size of the 
public sector" (2005: 490). Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2008) argue that radical right parties 
represent disparate `losers' of globalization.8 Due to declining identification with workers' 
parties and organizations, manual workers are likely to consider more electoral choices, 
not necessarily on the basis of their economic views, but also on the basis of their 
authoritarian tendencies (Bjorklund and Andersen 1999).  
 
How then do radical right parties respond to the diverse economic interests among their 
ranks? Mudde underlines the increasing orientation towards social market economy in 
radical right party literature, bringing these parties' positions close to Christian 
democratic parties, or even the social democratic `third-way' (2007: 124). Derks (2006) 
suggests that in order to capture disenchanted industrial workers hurt by globalization, 
post-industrial society and the supply of cheaper immigrant labour, radical right parties 
use a mix of egalitarianism and anti-welfare chauvinism. Similarly, Kitschelt's recent 
work reflecting on the radical right constituency's division over economic policies, 
moderates his `winning formula' (Kitschelt 2004: 10). He claims that radical right parties 
may not be on the extreme economic right, but rather on the ``market-liberal side of the 
political spectrum" -- a stance demonstrated by the few radical right parties which 
attained executive office (Kitschelt 2007: 1183). Testing Kitschelt's restated `winning 
                                                
8This evidence revisits Lipset's (1981) decades-old concept of working class authoritarianism.  
 35 
formula' on three cases, De Lange (2007) empirically supports the claim that radical right 
parties have shifted their position to the economic center.  
 
This conceptual approach suggests that radical right parties hold discernible positions on 
major ideological dimensions. In fact the study of the radical right -- in line with the 
scholarship on political parties and actors in general -- uses spatial conceptions to account 
for party and voter placement. Kitschelt and McGann (1995, 2005), and Kitschelt (2007) 
analyze the ideal stance of radical right parties in the form of the `winning formula'. Van 
der Brug et al. (2005) explain radical right electoral success using party evaluations based 
on spatial proximity measures. Bjorklund and Andersen (1999) suggest that radical right 
voters in Scandinavia are positioned between the major left- and right-wing parties on 
economic issues. Ivarsflaten (2005) emphasizes the vulnerability of radical right parties, 
given the spatial differences among their voters on economic issues. Finally, Rydgren 
(2005) notes that radical right success starts with spatial electoral niches where there are 
``gaps between the voters' location in the political space and the perceived position of the 
parties'' (2005: 418).9  
 
Spatial theory provides a classical understanding of political competition by 
conceptualizing it as spanning continuous issue scales, simplified into issue dimensions  
(Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957)10. Parties take positions within this dimensional structure 
                                                
9 A significant outlier to this approach is Mudde (2007), who considers the discourse of radical right 
parties, underlining their ``schizophrenic" positioning (2007: 135-7). 
 
10 Originally, spatial competition was conceptualized in a single dimension. Later models have relaxed the 
assumption of uni-dimensionality; their aim, however, was only to test whether and under what conditions 
equilibrium solutions hold in multiple dimensions (Chappel and Keech 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1989; 
Schofield 1993). 
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in response to voter distributions. For spatial theory, the dimensional structure of political 
space is an assumed context within which competition occurs. Consequently, the spatial 
tradition sees competition as a contest over party positioning with respect to voters, who 
minimize the aggregate distance between themselves and the party they vote for in n-
dimensional space.  
 
The application of spatial theory to radical right party study has been importantly 
modified by Meguid (2005, 2008). While utilizing spatial representation of competition 
among mainstream parties and radical right parties, Meguid considers not only party 
positioning, but also issue salience and issue ownership. This leads her to formulate a 
strategic game in which radical right parties present new political issues into political 
discourse, and mainstream parties choose to engage or dismiss these issues, thus either 
boosting or lowering their salience (2008: 28). This broadens the spatial conception of 
political competition by demonstrating how issue salience allows strategic interaction 
between parties that are not spatial neighbours.  
 
Meguid's work highlights how the inclusion of issue salience and ownership opens new 
strategic possibilities in party competition. Its implications are, however, even more 
profound. When political actors invest salience into new cross-cutting political issues, 
they are introducing new issue dimensions and redefining the political space where 
competition occurs. Under these conditions, parties are likely to be invested in some 
dimensions more than others. While they are likely to take clear positions on the 
dimensions of their primary interest, it may be logical for them to avoid taking clear 
stances on the dimensions in which they are not invested. Taking positions thus may be 
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an inappropriate strategy in the context of multidimensional competition -- and 
consequently, so may be its study. Thus, the question `where radical right parties stand' 
may not be the right question to ask. The next section turns to an analysis of the 
implications of multidimensional party competition in greater detail. 
 
Dimensional Approach 
 
The dimensional approach to competition introduced by this article is based on two core 
premises. First, the structure of political competition is not merely a fixed stage, but 
rather is itself the subject of competition. This approach understands political competition 
as a contest over the presence and bundling of political issues into various issue 
dimensions. Competition is then a contest over which issues or issue dimensions 
dominate political discourse and voter decision-making. Political parties thus do not only 
take positions on issue dimensions, they actively seek to alter the structure of competition 
to their advantage by manipulating these issues.   
 
The second premise of the dimensional approach is that parties do not merely respond to 
voter preferences by taking positions, but that they also seek to affect voters' choices 
through emphasizing certain issues in political campaigns. This is borrowed from issue 
ownership and salience theory  (Budge & Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Petrocik 1996), 
which argues that parties strategically increase the salience of those issues on which they 
hold advantaged positions, while trying to mute issues somehow harmful to them. The 
relationship between voter preferences and party strategies is thus more complex than 
spatial theory suggests. Parties may on the one hand fill popular niches by championing 
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publicly salient, but politically untapped issues. On the other hand, parties may affect the 
popular salience of issues by either emphasizing or ignoring them.11 
  
The dimensional approach points to two theoretically separate party strategies -- issue 
introduction and issue blurring. First, as originally formulated in William Riker's 
heresthetics, political parties tactically alter political competition by introducing novel 
issues into political discourse (Riker 1982, 1986)12. Introducing a new issue may produce 
a new dimension of political conflict and create a competitive niche for its protagonist, 
particularly if the issue does not naturally fold into the standing structure of competition. 
A party may also wish to introduce a new issue on which it is likely to be viewed 
favourably. Finally, a party may choose to introduce a new political issue with the aim of 
creating tensions within competing parties, thus weakening them.  
 
Second, political parties may strategically avoid stances on some dimensions of 
multidimensional political conflict, and engage in what this article terms position 
blurring. Since political parties may have different stakes in different issue dimensions, 
they may not simply mute the salience of issues secondary to them. Rather, parties may 
attempt to project vague, contradictory or ambiguous positions on these issues. The aim 
of the strategy is to mask a party's spatial distance from voters in order to either attract 
broader support, or at least not deter voters on these issues. Position blurring is unlikely 
                                                
11 These premises are consistent with spatial theory, as they effectively entail emphasizing (spatial) 
differences on a dimension which previously either lacked salience or where no differences between parties 
existed.  
 
12 See also Budge et al. (1987), Rabinowitz & Macdonald (1989), Rabinowitz et al. (1991), Carmines & 
Stimson (1989). 
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to be a successful strategy if applied on all issues. However, in the context of competing 
along one or few issue dimensions, blurring positions on other dimensions may be 
beneficial.  
 
This is a contradictory expectation to the `obfuscation' literature in American politics, 
which almost invariably concludes on both formal and empirical grounds that taking 
ambiguous positions is a costly strategy (Shepsle 1972, Enelow & Hinich 1981, Bartels 
1986, Franklin 1991, Alvarez 1998). This literature, however, considers uni-dimensional 
competition. Blurring positions on a unique dimension of conflict is a profoundly 
different situation than blurring positions on some dimensions, while presenting clear 
stances on others. Position blurring on some dimensions may be a rational strategy in the 
context of multidimensional issue competition.  
 
Position blurring may take on different forms. First, parties may avoid presenting a stance 
all together. More frequently, parties may present vague or contradictory positions on a 
given issue dimension. Mudde (2007: 127) reports, for example, that many radical right 
parties mix appeals for low taxation and privatization with economic protectionism, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. This ideological profile combines stances which are 
not usually connected, as most parties associate low taxation and privatization with 
economic liberalism. Misaligning stances on issues commonly attached to a unique 
dimension allows parties to blur their general dimensional positioning, while giving them 
the opportunity to present different voters with contradictory programs. Position blurring 
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can thus appear as either a lack of a position, as concurrent multiplicity of positions, or as 
positional instability over time.   
 
The strategies stemming from dimensional competition carry different costs. The parties 
facing higher costs to issue introduction and position blurring are likely to be established 
political parties with long-standing histories, organizational apparatuses, core 
constituencies and well-entrenched ideological images. They are likely to face 
organizational and ideological barriers to shifting political salience to new issues and 
blurring their positions on others. Established, mainstream parties are likely to find it 
harder to convince their membership and core constituents of the merits of adopting new 
issues and obscuring their positions on old ones. Their ideological heritage is likely 
connected with the historical development of social cleavages of their polity (see Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967). This means that their political stance is known, entrenched and their 
appeal stickier. Consequently, blurring positions on secondary issues may be futile and 
new issue introduction may spark crippling divisions.  
 
On the contrary, radical right parties are less constrained in new issue introduction and 
position blurring. They have entered European party systems in recent decades as 
outsiders ostracized by political elites. Furthermore, they have centralized, hierarchical 
organizational structures which favour top-down decision-making patterns (Heinisch 
2003). This gives them organizational facility in strategically contesting the dimensional 
structure of party competition.  
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Moreover, radical right parties face an electoral incentive for employing these 
dimensional strategies. As the literature on radical right social bases suggests, there is a 
dimensional discrepancy to radical right support. Radical right voters share an ideological 
affinity on non-economic, socio-cultural issues, such as immigration or law and order, 
while they are divided over the economy. This argument implies that radical right voters 
have different preference distributions across issue dimensions. This leads to the 
following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Radical right voters hold significantly more dispersed economic positions 
than major party supporters, while being less dispersed on non-economic, socio-cultural 
issues. 
 
Consequently, radical right parties face different stakes in different issue dimensions. 
They are induced to compete on non-economic, socio-cultural issues by overemphasizing 
them in their discourse.  
 
Hypothesis 2: While major parties place comparable emphasis on both non-economic and 
economic issues, radical right parties overemphasize non-economic issues, while muting 
economic issues. 
 
This article argues that while competing on the non-economic dimension, radical right 
parties do not merely deemphasize economic issues. In order not to deter supporters with 
divergent economic outlooks, radical right parties also present blurred stances on the 
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economic dimension. The positional ambiguity of radical right parties on the economy 
can be analyzed across data sources, across party types and over time:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The assessment of radical right party positions on economic issues 
significantly diverges across different data sources, while the evaluation of their non-
economic positions is largely consistent.   
 
Hypothesis 3b: Voters and experts are significantly less certain about radical right party 
placement on economic issues then about the economic placement of other party types.  
 
Hypothesis 3c: The assessment of radical right party positions on economic issues 
manifests significantly greater fluctuation over time than that of major parties.    
 
The strategic increase in non-economic issue salience combined with position blurring on 
the economic dimension on the part of the radical right is likely to have positive electoral 
effects. By shifting emphasis towards their preferred issue dimension and distorting their 
economic stances, radical right parties attract their voters on the basis of non-economic, 
rather than economic issue considerations.  
 
Hypothesis 4: While voters consider both economic and non-economic issues when 
voting for major parties, they consider only non-economic (and not economic) issues 
when supporting the radical right.  
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Despite its benefits, position blurring has its limits. Upon entering government, parties 
become responsible for implementing explicit policies, which circumscribes their ability 
to present vague or multiple positions, and forces them to take clear stances. Furthermore, 
parties who succeed in entering government with ambiguous views, may face public 
embarrassment.  The fate of some radical right parties, particularly the Austrian FPO, 
which lost substantial public support after entering governments underlines this point 
(Luther 2003, Heinisch 2003, Fallend 2004). While an effective strategy in opposition, 
position blurring becomes a liability in government.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Government participation limits position blurring of radical right parties.  
 
Data and Operationalization 
 
This article limits itself to contemporary (early to mid 2000s) Western Europe, where 
scholars argue the political space can be depicted in two dimensions.13 The first 
dimension relates to economics, ranging from state-directed redistribution to market 
allocation. The second dimension relates to non-economic, socio-cultural issues, 
concerning such factors as lifestyle choice, national identity, immigration and religious 
values, and it ranges from socially liberal, alternative politics to socially conservative and 
traditional politics (Kitschelt 1992; Laver and Hunt 1992; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
2002; Kitschelt 2003; Marks et. al. 2006; Benoit and Laver 2006; Vachudova and 
Hooghe 2009. Since the second dimension tends to be more complex and loosely 
structured, this article refers to it simply as the non-economic dimension.  
                                                
13 Although two dimensional political space is certainly a simplification, two dimensions are sufficient for 
capturing the key dynamics of issue emphasis and position blurring. 
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To locate parties on these dimensions this article uses the 1999, 2002 and 2006 Chapel 
Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), which place parties on an economic left-right scale and on 
green, alternative and liberal versus traditional, authoritarian and nationalist policies 
(Steenbergen & Marks 2007, Hooghe et al. 2010). The salience assigned by parties to the 
dimensions is assessed using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset (Budge 
et al. 1987). Table 9 in the appendix lists the CMP categories that were used to construct 
an additive measure of salience for the economic and the non-economic dimensions. 
Voter positions are determined using four sources: the World Values Surveys 1999-2000 
(WVS), the 2004 European Election Study (EES), the European Social Survey 2006 
(ESS) and the International Social Survey Program 2006 (ISSP). To construct economic 
and non-economic scales of voter preferences, I use factor scores from separate factor 
analyses on the economic, and non-economic items of each dataset. The specific items 
used for each dimension in a given dataset are listed in table 9 in the appendix.14  
 
The article considers all Western European parties generally referred to as radical right, 
populist right, extreme right or neo-fascist by the party literature (cf. Golder 2003; Norris 
2005; Kitschelt 2007). The case selection is, however, constrained by the data.15 
Consequently, the article is limited to the study of 17 radical right parties in nine 
countries. These are: FPO and BZO in Austria; FN and VB in Belgium; FP and DF in 
                                                
14 The 2004 European Election Study (EES) only includes a question about general left-right self-
placement. It does not contain any specific issue items which may be used for constructing an economic 
and non-economic dimension. 
15 The CHES datasets, which are central to the dimensional analyses, do not cover Norway and 
Switzerland, while some radical right parties score below the dataset's 3% cutoff, and thus are not included. 
The CMP dataset tends to cover only electorally larger parties, hence a number of smaller radical right 
parties are not covered.  
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Denmark; True Finns in Finland; FN and MPF in France; REP, NPD and DVU in 
Germany; LAOS in Greece; AN and LN in Italy; and LPF and PVV in the Netherlands. 
Table 11 in the appendix contains the details.  
 
Major parties are operationalized as the most significant political parties on either side of 
the left-right spectrum in each party system. These parties are either the primary 
governing parties or the main opposition parties. In cases where more parties can be 
considered as major right or major left parties, all such parties are included. See table 11  
in the appendix for details.  
 
Finally, it should be stressed that each analysis considering party placement variance 
measures voter or expert deviations from party-specific means. Consequently, the natural 
differences between party positions are removed from the analyses. 
 
Analyses and Results 
 
Radical Right Voters and Issue Dimensions 
 
This section tests hypothesis 1, demonstrating that radical right voter preferences are 
highly dispersed on the economic dimension, compared to the preferences of major party 
supporters. Simultaneously, radical right voter positions are significantly more compact 
on the non-economic dimension, as compared to major party voters. Table 2 presents a 
summary of party specific standard deviations of radical right and major party supporters 
on the two dimensions. It considers each voter's deviation from party specific mean 
voters, thus removing the differences in individual party placements. This analysis 
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utilizes the ESS 2006 survey because it provides data on both the economic and non-
economic dimension and it is contemporaneous with the CHES 2006 data used later. 
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Table 2 Variance Ratio Tests of Voter Positions 
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The statistics in table 2 suggest that radical right voters have a greater variance around 
their party's mean voter on economic issues. The variance ratio test shows that this 
variance is significantly greater than those of either the major right or major left parties. 
The radical right voter dispersion on the non-economic dimension is significantly smaller 
than that of major left parties, and almost identical to that of major right parties.   
 
The causal order between radical right voter and party positioning is unclear. It is 
difficult to say whether some voters support radical right parties because of the parties' 
clear non-economic stances and vague economic stances, or whether radical right parties 
adjust their stances to fit these voter distributions. However, given these distributions of 
radical right supporters, there exists a political niche combining authoritarian positions on 
non-economic issues with a broad and dispersed economic placement, allowing the 
capture of wider economic constituencies. The next sections consider how radical right 
parties behave in light of this electoral niche. 
 
Radical Right Parties and Issue Salience 
 
Testing hypothesis 2, this section suggests that rather than contesting the entrenched 
issues of political competition, radical right parties highlight nationalism, ethnocentrism 
and general opposition to the political establishment. Their main issue domain thus lies 
not on the primary, economic, dimension, but on the secondary dimension.  
 
Figure 4 compares the salience that radical right parties place on economic and non-
economic issues with major right and major left parties. Major parties devote about 30% 
of their manifestos to economic, as well as to non-economic, issues. They tend to slightly 
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overemphasize economic issues, which is logical given the central role the economy 
plays in mainstream political discourse and public policy. Radical right parties, on the 
contrary, overemphasize non-economic issues by devoting over 40% of their manifestos 
to them on average. Economic issues are instead neglected, with only some 22% of 
manifesto space. The most striking is the relative difference: radical right parties devote 
almost twice as much of their manifestos to non-economic, rather than economic, issues.  
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Figure 4 Issue Salience by Party Type 
 Comparative Manifesto Data. Average salience by party type for years 2000 and up.  
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A similar picture emerges when considering the long-term trend of economic and non-
economic issue salience of these three party types (figure 5). Both major left and major 
right parties balance their attention between economic and non-economic issues over the 
post-war period. Radical right parties, on the other hand, place more or less constant 
emphasis on economic issues, while devoting increasingly more of their manifestos to 
non-economic issues over time.  
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Figure 5 Issue Salience in the Post-War Period 
Comparative Manifesto Data 
 53 
Economic Position Blurring 
 
Radical right parties project themselves as parties contesting predominantly non-
economic issues. For strategic reasons, they muddy their economic outlooks and shy 
away from discussing economic policies explicitly and at length, which allows them to 
attract a broader coalition of voters. This economic position blurring is not only picked 
up by voters, who tend to evaluate the radical right on the basis of their non-economic 
issue preferences, but also by party experts.  
 
This section tests hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c. It first considers the assessment of radical 
right placements across multiple datasets. Second, it predicts the standard deviations of 
voter and expert party placements by party types, demonstrating the particularity of the 
radical right. Finally, it addresses the fluctuations of radical right party placements over 
time.  
 
Figures 6 and 7 present ordinal expert placement of political parties and ordinal 
positioning of mean radical right voters on the economic and non-economic 
dimensions16. Each row corresponds to a different source of information on party 
placement within a given party system. Parties are arranged horizontally from left to right 
on the economic dimension and from social liberalism to authoritarianism on the non-
                                                
16 Expert judgments and voter preferences are coded on different scales. When experts place political 
parties and voters outline their positioning on political issues, there is no certainty that they conceive of 
political space in comparable ways. It is thus impossible to say that distance on the voters' scale is the same 
as the equivalent distance on the scale used by the party experts. As a result, it is erroneous to report the 
placement on a continuous scale. I rather opt to report the placement as ordinal level data, which compares 
voter positioning to other voters and expert placement relative to other expert placements. 
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economic dimension. They are lined up by major left and major right parties (lightly 
shaded) within each party system, while radical right parties are emphasized in bold.  
 
The data show that radical right economic placement seems rather erratic. While some 
sources suggest that a radical right party stands on the extreme economic right, others 
place it to the left of the major left party in the given system (figure 6). This contrasts 
sharply with radical right positioning on the non-economic dimension of competition, 
where a vast majority of sources agree, and place the radical right on the authoritarian 
fringe (figure 7).  
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Figure 6 Economic Positioning of Radical Right Parties 
 
Extreme right parties are in bold. Anchored by mainstream left- and right-wing parties. 
Please see appendix on details regarding the construction of dimensions. 
AUSTRIA Econ Left Econ 
Right
FPO BZO
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
KPO SPO Grune FPO OVP LIF 0.67 .
KPO SPO Grune LIF FPO BZO OVP 0.71 0.86
Grune SPO OVP FPO LIF 0.80 .
Grune SPO FPO BZO OVP LIF 0.50 0.67
0.13 0.13
BELGIUM 
Flanders
Econ Left Econ Right VB
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
SP Agalev ID CVP VB VLD 0.83
Agalev/GroenSP.A VB CD&V N-VA VLD 0.50
Agalev SP VU-ID21 CVP VLD VB 1.00
Agalev/GroenSPA CD&V NVA VB VLD 0.83
0.21
DENMARK Econ 
Left
Econ 
Right
FP DF
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
ISSP 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
EL SF SD FP KRF CD RV KP V DF 0.40 1.00
EL SF FP SD RV KRF DF CD V KF 0.30 0.70
EL SF SD RV DF KRF New Alliance V KP . 0.56
EL SF SD CD RV KRF DF KF V FP 1.00 0.70
EL SF SD DF V KF RV 0.57
0.38 0.18
FRANCE Econ 
Left
Econ 
Right
FN MPF
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
ISSP 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
PCF VERTS FN PS UDF RPR DL 0.43 .
PCF PS VERTS MPF UDF FN UMP 0.86 0.57
PCF PS VERTS UDF RPR FN 1.00 .
PCF PS VERTS UDF RPR RPF DL FN 1.00 .
PCF PS VERTS UDF FN UMP MPF 0.71 1.00
0.24 0.30
GERMANY Econ Left Econ 
Right
REP NPD
Voters 
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
ISSP 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
PDS REP SPD CDU-CSU Grunen FDP 0.33
PDS REP NPD-DVU SPD Grunen CDU-CSU FDP 0.29 0.43
PDS SPD Grunen CDU-CSU NPD REP FDP 0.86 0.71
PDS Grunen SPD CDU-CSU DVU REP FDP 0.86 0.71
PDS SPD Grunen CDU-CSU FDP . .
0.32 0.16
ITALY Econ 
Left
Econ 
Right 
LN AN
Voters WVS 1999
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
RC PDS CDU PSDI PPI FdV CCD LN AN FI 0.80 0.90
RC PDS FdV PPI PSDI AN CDU CCD FI LN 0.60 1.00
RC DS FdV SDI DL IdV UDC AN FI LN 1.00 0.80
0.20 0.10
NETHERLANDS Econ 
Left
Econ 
Right
LPF PVV
Voters ISSP 2006
Experts CHES 2006
SP LPF(Fortuyn)PvdA Groen CDA CU PVV(Wilders)D66 VVD 0.22 0.78
SP Groen PvdA CU D66 CDA VVD PVV . 1.00
0.16
BELGIUM 
Francophone
Econ Left Econ Right FN
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
FN ECOLO PS PSC PRL-FD 0.20
FN PS ECOLO MR 0.25
ECOLO PS PSC PRL-FD FN 1.00
PS ECOLO CDH MR .
0.45
FINLAND Econ 
Left
Econ 
Right
True Finns
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
ISSP 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
VAS SDP True 
Finns
VIHR KD KESK RKP KOK 0.38
VAS KD SDP KESK VIHR RKP True FinnsKOK 0.88
VAS VIHR SDP RKP KD TrueFinnsKESK KOK 0.75
VAS SDP VIHR KESK True FinnsRKP KOK 0.71
VAS SDP VIHR True FinnsKD KESK RKP KOK 0.50
0.20
GREECE Econ Left Econ Right LAOS
CHES 2006 KKE DIKKI SYRIZA PASOK LAOS ND 0.83
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Figure 7 Non-Economic Positioning of Radical Right Parties 
 
Extreme right parties are in bold. Anchored by mainstream left- and right-wing parties. 
Please see appendix on details regarding the construction of dimensions. 
AUSTRIA Lib Auth FPO BZO
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
KPO G LIF SPO FPO OVP 0.83 .
Grune SPO LIF OVP KPO BZO FPO 1.00 0.86
LF GA SPO OVP FPO 1.00
Grune LIF SPO OVP BZO FPO 1.00 0.83
0.08 0.02
DENMARK Lib Auth FP DF
Voters WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts CHES 1999
CHES 2006
EL RV SF KF SD CD V DF FP KRF 0.90 0.80
EL RV SF CD SD V KF KristendemDF FP 1.00 0.90
EL SF RV SD KRF V KF CD FP DF 0.90 1.00
EL RV SF SD V KF DF . 1.00
0.06 0.10
FRANCE Lib Auth FN MPF
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006 
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
VERTS PCF PS DL UDF RPR FN 1.00 .
VERTS PS PCF UDF MPF UMP FN 1.00 0.71
VERTS PS UDF PCF DL RPR RPF FN 1.00 .
VERTS PS PCF UDF UMP MPF FN 1.00 0.86
0.00 0.10
GERMANY Lib Auth REP NPD-
DVU
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
Grunen PDS SPD FDP CDU-CSU REP 1.00 .
Grunen SPD Linke FDP CDU-CSU NPD/DVU REP 1.00 0.86
Grunen FDP PDS SPD CDU-CSU REP DVU 0.86 1.00
Grunen Linke FDP SPD CDU-CSU . .
0.08 0.10
ITALY Lib Auth LN AN
Voters WVS 1999
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
FdV RC PDS PSDI CDU AN FI LN PPI CCD 0.80 0.60
FdV PDS RC PSDI UD LN PPI FI CCD CDU AN 0.60 1.00
FdV RC SDI DS DL IdV FI UDC LN AN 0.90 1.00
0.15 0.23
NETHERLANDS Lib Auth PVV
Experts CHES 2006 GL D66 PvdA VVD SP PVV CDA CU 0.75
BELGIUM 
Flanders
Lib Auth VB
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006 
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
Agalev SP ID VLD PSC VB CVP 0.86
Agalev/Gro N-VA VLD SP.A CD&V VB 1.00
Agalev VU-ID21 SP VLD CVP VB 1.00
Groen SPA VLD CD&V NVA VB 1.00
0.07
BELGIUM 
Francophone
Lib Auth FN
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006 
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
ECOLO PS PRL-FD PSC FN 1.00
ECOLO CDH MR PS FN 1.00
ECOLO PS PRL-FD PSC FN 1.00
ECOLO PS MR CDH .
0.00
FINLAND Lib Auth True Finns
Voters
WVS 1999
ESS 2006
Experts
CHES 1999
CHES 2006
VIHR VAS RKP KOK SDP KESK KD True Finns 1.00
VIHR VAS RKP KOK SDP KD KESK True Finns 1.00
VIHR VAS SDP RKP/SFP KOK KESK True Finns 1.00
VIHR VAS RKP/SFP SDP KOK KESK True FinnsKD 0.88
0.06
GREECE Lib Auth LAOS
Experts CHES 2006 SYRIZA PASOK KKE ND DIKKI LAOS 1.00
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The right-hand column of figures 6 and 7 provides summary measures of radical right 
ordinal placement, while taking the number of parties in the party system into account.17 
The standard deviation of these placements is reported below each party. The mean 
standard deviation -- that is the average discrepancy between the placement measures of 
each radical right party -- is 0.226 on the economic dimension, while it is mere 0.081 on 
the non-economic dimension.  
 
This evidence, demonstrating that radical right party placement on the non-economic 
dimension is very consistent across data sources, but their placement on economic issues 
diverges extensively within each system, supports hypothesis 3a. This finding 
underscores the limited utility of spatial conceptions when studying radical right parties. 
Rather than holding positions on economic issues, radical right parties try to avoid clear 
economic stances. 
 
Consequently, it is important to address whether radical right placement varies 
significantly more than that of other parties. Table 2 presents results of OLS regression 
analyses predicting voter and expert standard deviations on party placement on the 
economic and non-economic dimensions18. The standard deviations are explained by 
party family: major right, major left, radical right and radical left.19 In addition, the 
                                                
17 The summary measure takes the ordered position of an expert party placement or mean voter of radical 
right party on economic and non-economic issues, while adjusting for the number of parties in the given 
system. For example, if the radical right is 5th of 7 parties ordered along the economic left-right scale, it 
receives the score 5/7=0.714. 
 
18 These are again party-level standard deviations, measuring either voter or expert deviations from party-
specific means, thus removing the differences in individual party placements. 
 
19 See table 11 in the appendix for the list of parties in each party family. 
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models control for general party characteristics: distance from the center of the left-right 
dimension; government participation and vote share. Government participation is 
interacted with the radical right dummy variable in order to assess hypothesis 5.  
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Table 3 Predicting Voter and Expert Placement Standard Deviations 
 
 
OLS Regression. The dependent variables are party level standard deviations -- they measure either voter 
or expert deviations from party-specific means. Voter placement of parties on the general left-right scale 
measured in the European Election Surveys 2004. Voter positions on economic and non-economic 
dimension measured in the European Social Survey 2006. Expert placement on economic left-right scale 
and social liberalism and authoritarianism measured in the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Partial slopes 
calculated using Stata's `xi3’ command written by Michael Mitchell and Phil Ender. 
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The results in table 3 support hypothesis 3b suggesting that radical right parties blur their 
economic positions. In the first three models concerning the economic dimension, the 
coefficient on the radical right is positive and statistically significant, meaning that voters 
and experts are significantly less certain (have higher standard deviations) about radical 
right parties. Major parties do not have a significant effect on voter and expert 
(un)certainty. Interestingly, both voters and experts are more certain about the economic 
placement of radical left parties, as the radical left has a negative effect on blurring (their 
standard deviations are significantly smaller). On the non-economic dimension (models 4 
and 5), party families do not predict the certainty of voter or expert placement at all. This 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the (un)certainty of voters and experts 
about major and radical party placements on the non-economic dimension -- they are 
comparably certain about the placement of all of these parties.  
 
These results reject the speculation that voters and experts simply do not know as much 
about the parties belonging to the radical right and left, which tend to be smaller and 
stand on the political extremes. The results further reject the notion that the dependent 
variable of expert and voter standard deviations thus merely taps the voters'/experts' (lack 
of) knowledge, rather than party strategies. First, the models control for vote share and 
distance from the center. Second, voters and experts are more certain about radical left 
placement, while exhibiting significant doubts about the radical right on the economic 
dimension. This discrepancy cannot be simply attributed to voter and expert lack of 
knowledge of smaller, outlying parties. It is very likely that deliberate partisan 
strategizing -- economic blurring of the radical right -- is the cause.   
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The interaction effect in the models of table 3 provides a basis for evaluating hypothesis 
5, which expects radical right parties to decrease their economic blurring when in 
government. The partial slope associated with the effect of government for radical right 
parties shows significant effect in the expected direction only in model 1. This supports 
hypothesis 5 by showing that voters are significantly more certain of radical right party 
placement on economic issues when these have been in government. However, since the 
finding is not reproduced in other models, the test of hypothesis 5 is inconclusive. A 
more refined time-series assessment of radical right strategies when in government, 
which is beyond the scope of this article, is likely to provide a clearer answer. 
 
The final test of radical right economic blurring, evaluating hypothesis 3c, assesses 
radical right party ideological stability on this dimension over time. Given the 
hypothesized vagueness of radical right economic placements, we should expect 
significantly greater positional shifts on the economic dimension on the part of radical 
right parties than on the part of major parties. These shifts should not be interpreted as 
true movement of the radical right's positions, but rather as a reflection of the uncertainty 
of their positions. 
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Table 4 Party Position Change Over Time 
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Table 4 summarizes the mean positional change of radical right and major parties over 
three time periods measured by the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys -- 1999, 2002 and 2006. 
The table provides statistical tests of differences in average position change of individual 
parties over this time period. Supporting hypothesis 3c, it demonstrates that radical right 
parties appear to change their positions on economic issues significantly more than major 
parties. On non-economic issues, radical right parties are viewed as not significantly 
different from major parties. 
 
Thus, the evidence so far suggests that radical right parties employ deliberate 
dimensional strategies. They compete on non-economic issues, while blurring their 
stances on economic issues. These parties emphasize non-economic issues over economic 
ones in their manifestos. Both voters and experts are significantly uncertain about radical 
right economic placement, while they are more certain about the placements of other 
parties. Finally, radical right parties exhibit seeming instability in their economic 
placements over time. All of this suggests that radical right parties purposefully obscure 
their economic placements. The next section considers the electoral consequences of this 
strategy. 
 
Why Support the Radical Right? 
 
Since radical right parties tend to mostly consider non-economic issues, voters should 
support radical right parties when they agree with them on non-economic issues, as per 
hypothesis 4. Economic issues should play a limited role in voters' calculus over casting a 
vote for the radical right.  
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Figure 8 reports results of a Multinomial Logit Model predicting vote choice for radical 
right parties using the 2006 European Social Survey. The model predicts party vote 
choice by positioning on the economic and social dimensions, while controlling for 
voters' gender, age, education and income.20 Although this analysis presents combined 
data across party systems, looking at individual parties produces substantively identical 
results. Substantively identical results can be also obtained using other datasets21. The 
figure presents the predicted probabilities of voting for radical right parties, given a 
voter's positioning on the economic dimension22, while other predictors are held at their 
mean.  
 
The graphs support hypothesis 4 by showing that voters of radical right parties cast their 
votes on the basis of non-economic issue considerations. Radical right parties attract 
voters who stand at or near the authoritarian extreme of the non-economic dimension. 
Conversely, voters do not tend to place similar emphasis on economic concerns when 
voting for the radical right. Although statistically significant, positioning on the economic 
dimension does not substantively affect the probability of voting for the radical right. The 
                                                
20 The details of the model are presented in table 10 in the appendix. The core assumption of Multinomial 
Logit -- the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) -- holds when tested with the Small-Hsiao test. In 
any case, the alternative model -- Multinomial Probit -- is considered problematic, although not requiring 
the IIA assumption. It is computationally complex and with a larger number of choice categories becomes 
intractable. Furthermore, recent methodological literature suggests that the estimates of Multinomial Probit 
are almost always less accurate than those of Multinomial Logit (Kropko 2008). 
 
21 For details, please contact the author. 
 
22 The economic axis is based on standardized scores of variable `gincdif’ in ESS 2006, concerning voter 
propensity to redistribute income, which is the only question tapping explicitly economic preferences. The 
non-economic axis is based on standardized factor scores derived from principal factor analysis of the non-
economic items of ESS 2006, listed in table 5 of the appendix. Given the standardized scores, the axes run 
from roughly -2.5 to +2.5. 
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predicted probabilities stemming from the economic dimension are very low, and the 
economic left-right curve is almost flat. In comparison, mainstream parties attract voters 
on both dimensions. 
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Figure 8 Vote Choice for Different Party Types 
 
Predicted probabilities for economic and non-economic positions while other variables held at their means.  
Based on MNL model presented in table 3. 2006 European Social Survey.  
Estimated using Stata 11.1 `prgen’ command.  
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The radical right's strategies of deliberately understating economic issues and blurring its 
stances on them shape its electoral fortunes. Since voters do not support the radical right 
on the basis of economic preferences, radical right parties are able to attract a broader 
electoral coalition, spanning from unemployed industrial workers to some white collar 
workers and the self-employed. Multidimensional party competition, with its strategies of 
issue emphasis and position blurring, permits the amalgamation of voters united by some 
preferences, but divided by others, with significant electoral consequences.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article explores the puzzle of radical right party positioning. Using party manifesto 
data, expert data on party placement, and data on voter preferences, it argues that radical 
right parties contest the structure of political competition. Due to their investment in 
various issues, they employ diverse strategies in different dimensions. Consequently, 
radical right parties emphasize and take clear ideological stances on the authoritarian 
fringe of the non-economic dimension, while deliberately avoiding precise economic 
placement.  
 
This article presents a dimensional approach to political competition, which sees politics 
as competition over the issue composition of political space. Parties compete for voters 
by seeking to shift the basis of political competition. To sidestep major parties, non-
entrenched parties like the radical right are inclined to explore previously neglected 
issues, such as nationalism and anti-immigration -- a strategy facilitated by their 
hierarchical organizational structure. 
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This dimensional competition makes viable the partisan strategy of position blurring. 
While position blurring has been analyzed as costly in unidimensional competition, it is a 
potentially rewarding strategy in multidimensional contests. While competing on the non-
economic dimension, radical right parties keep a consciously opaque profile on economic 
issues. Through this position blurring they remove or misrepresent their spatial distances 
from voters, and attract a broader coalition of economic interests.  
 
Radical right parties benefit directly from their strategy of economic position blurring. 
Voters respond to partisan signals and vote for radical right parties on the basis of their 
non-economic issue interests, rather than economic preferences. This benefits the radical 
right by securing electoral support of socially authoritarian voters, without deterring 
voters on the basis of economic issue preferences. Blurring ideological positions is thus a 
rational strategy on the part of the European radical right.  
 
The dimensional approach to political competition presented in this article is consistent 
with the spatial paradigm in that it considers party and voter placement in n-dimensional 
space. It is, however, inconsistent with spatial theory, which sees party competition as 
position-taking, without considering the relative stakes that parties may have in different 
issue dimensions. It is the argument of this article that these stakes determine partisan 
strategic calculations, potentially leading them to avoid taking positional stances. The 
academic debate over radical right placement on economic issues should consequently 
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consider the limits of spatial theory, and acknowledge the possibility that parties may 
compete by deliberate position blurring. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Westernization of Political Competition in Eastern Europe 
 
Introduction 
 
Eastern European party competition is argued to be distinctive from that of western 
Europe. Eastern European party systems are assumed to be ideologically looser, and -- if 
structure does appear -- it is expected to be contrary to the west. In Eastern Europe, the 
communist legacy is thought to bind left-wing economics with social conservatism, while 
the economic right remains the champion of social liberalism.   
 
This paper presents empirical evidence that political competition in Eastern Europe is 
converging on the western pattern, which combines left-wing economic outlooks with 
social liberalism. This convergence is, nonetheless, uneven across Eastern Europe, 
begging an explanation of its variance.  
 
This paper explains the structure in Eastern European party competition with two 
interrelated arguments. First, it demonstrates that the meaning of the non-economic, 
socio-cultural dimension is changing. It is no longer dominated by issues of elementary 
civil liberties and democratic rights, which were central to democratic transitions. 
Instead, the socio-cultural dimension is increasingly defined by more typically western 
concerns over cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and modern secularism versus 
traditionalism. Second, under these altered conditions, political competition in Eastern 
Europe becomes determined by deeper historical experiences. This paper argues that the 
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historical experiences of state and nation building are the primary determinants of current 
political competition in Eastern Europe.    
 
The paper analyzes 14 Eastern European countries that are covered by the Chapel Hill 
Expert Surveys (CHES)(Hooghe et al. 2010).23 It first reviews the literature on Eastern 
European political competition. Second, it presents and discusses the empirical evidence 
of competition change in Eastern Europe, based on the 2002 and 2006 iterations of 
CHES. Third, the paper develops a theoretical explanation of the variance in this change. 
Fourth, it tests the general theoretical propositions using large-N, quantitative methods.24 
Before concluding, the paper considers four groups of cases in detail, highlighting the 
connections between historical experiences with state and nation building and current 
political competition.    
Political Competition in Eastern Europe 
 
Literature on political competition after communism has debated the role of social 
structure as basis for political contest and party ideology. Both sides of the debate, 
however, point to distinctions between post-communist party competition and 
competition in established democracies.  
 
One side of the debate argues that Eastern European party competition and ideological 
structuring differs from Western Europe due to its lacking social bases, making it 
                                                
23 These countries are: Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
24 The paper combines data from the CHES surveys, the Benoit and Laver (2006) party expert dataset, the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 1987), Fearon et al. (2007) data on ethnic fragmentation, 
Maddison's (N.d.) data on historical GDP levels, and Polity IV and Freedom House data on democratic 
development. 
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unstable, ideologically underspecified and personalistic. This view proceeds from the 
particular nature of Eastern European democratization which amounted to ``a triple 
transformation affecting all three levels of nationhood, constitution making, as well as the 
`normal politics' of allocation"(Offe 2004: 507). Consequently, a number of scholars 
argue that Eastern Europeans not only lack experience with the political process, they 
also lack clear political preferences associated with their socio-economic outlooks which 
are only forming.  Party building is thus dominated by elites, who create political parties 
only after the first free elections from within parliaments (Kopecky 1995, Agh 1996, 
Pridham and Lewis 1996, Zielinski 2002, Van Biezen 2003, Webb and White 2007), 
which leads to fluid, open party systems (Ost 1993, Mair 1997). The ideologically opaque 
character of Eastern European parties is further deepened by the necessity of economic 
liberalization, and later by the exigencies of European Union accession, which set the 
political agenda, circumscribing competition and ideological differentiation (Innes 2002, 
Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). These works see Eastern European political 
competition as rather unstructured and fickle.  
 
A growing line of scholarship opposes what they call the tabula rasa25 view of political 
competition in Eastern Europe. It argues that Eastern European political competition and 
ideological structuring is to a surprising degree rooted in social divides that inform voter 
preferences and translate into party ideologies.26 This view, however, also stresses 
                                                
25 See Kitschelt (1995). 
 
26 Extensive research by Evans and Whitefield concludes that ``[t]here is considerable evidence that post-
communist societies contain structured social and ideological divisions, that social factors -- especially age, 
education, religion, ethnicity, and occupational class -- significantly shape ideological perspectives, and 
that voters choose parties that in large measure programmatically reflect their interests.”(Whitefield 2002: 
191, Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1998, 2000). Others stress the significance of different social cleavages, 
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Eastern European distinctiveness from the ideological structure of the west. It 
concentrates on studying how previous communist regime types and the transition 
process structure political competition in Eastern European countries (Kitschelt 1995, 
Markowski 1997, Kitschelt et. al. 1999, Vachudova 2005, 2008). 
 
These works tend to divide Eastern Europe into groups. The democratic success stories -- 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and sometimes Slovenia -- were able to consolidate 
state institutions and carry out successful political transition with fast marketization, 
leading to party competition over socio-economic outlooks (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 
Kitschelt 1995, Tavits and Letki 2009). The intermediate category -- Estonia and Latvia -
- managed to marketize, but ethnic heterogeneity retained the potential of trumping social 
class in the formation of political competition (Evans and Whitefield 1993). Finally, the 
democratic laggards -- Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and to a lesser extent Slovakia -- 
initially failed to transfer power to democratic elites and to fully marketize, which gave 
rise to ideologically circumscribed, personalistic political competition (Kitschelt 1995, 
Vachudova 2005, 2008).  
 
This line of research thus concludes that Eastern European party competition is structured 
through voter demand and partisan supply. But -- although arguing for structure -- it also 
views political competition in Eastern Europe as different from that in the west. In the 
west, left-wing economics coincide with social liberalism. In the east, the left's 
                                                
such as ethnicity (Bunce 2003) or center-periphery (Mudde 2005). Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009) 
emphasize the stability of Eastern European political competition, concluding that there is no evidence of 
ideological de-alignment or realignment, and that Eastern European parties ``fulfill the conditions of 
representational consistency..."(ibid.: 686). 
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association with communist authoritarianism connects the economic left with social 
conservatism, which -- depending on the nature of the communist regime -- may lead to 
cooperation between left-wing and nationalist parties (Ishiyama 1998). The economic 
right, on the other hand, combines market liberalization with democratic opposition to 
communist rule, giving it socially liberal outlooks. Political competition in the East is 
almost a mirror image of the competition in the West (Kitschelt 1992, Marks et al. 2006, 
Vachudova and Hooghe 2009).  
 
Party Competition Change in Eastern Europe 
 
The view that Eastern European party competition is a mirror image of the west is, 
however, challenged by recent empirical evidence. The works of Marks et al. (2006) and 
Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) are based on data from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey. While this survey underlines the expected pattern of political competition in 
Eastern Europe, connecting left-wing economics with social conservatism, the 2006 
iteration of the same survey shows change in a number of Eastern European countries 
(Rovny and Edwards forthcoming).  
 
The change consists of two phenomena. First, economically left-wing parties are 
becoming more socially liberal. Second, economically right-wing parties are becoming 
more socially conservative. Table 5 documents this change. It presents the positioning of 
parties on economic and social issues in 2002 and 2006, as well as the change between 
these two years. The table demonstrates that economically right-wing parties have shifted 
towards social authoritarianism by about half a point on average, while the economic left 
has shifted towards social liberalism by almost one point. 
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 Table 5 Party Competition Change in Eastern Europe 
 
Party placement change by party family. Left-wing defined as scoring <5 on economic placement. Right-
wing defined as scoring >=5 on economic placement. Economic placement ranges from 0=left to 10=right. 
Social placement ranges from 0=conservative to 10=liberal. 10 Eastern European EU countries. Chapel Hill 
Expert Surveys 2002 and 2006. 
 
 
Taken together, this amount to the rotation of political competition in a number of 
countries, where left-wing economics are no longer associated with social conservatism, 
as expected and observed by the literature. Instead, we see a pattern typical for West 
European countries, where economically left-wing parties are more socially liberal than 
the economic right (Kitschelt 1992, Marks et al. 2006). Figure 9 depicts Eastern 
European party systems which have not undergone a rotation of competition. In all these 
six countries the economic left remains more socially conservative than the economic 
right. Figure 10, on the other hand, shows the four party systems where political 
competition no longer follows the predicted pattern of socially conservative left-wing 
parties. In these four countries, the axis of competition -- symbolized by the best-fitting 
line on the graphs -- has a negative slope, suggesting that the left is more socially liberal 
than the right.27 
                                                
27 The line of fit is weighted by party vote. Since political competition is mostly defined by larger parties in 
the system, it is logical to make the competition axis less sensitive to small parties. This strategy is 
followed by Marks et al. (2006) and Vachudova and Hooghe (2009). 
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Figure 9 Unrotated Political Space in Eastern Europe 2002-2006 
 
 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
 
 77 
Figure 10 Rotated Political Space in Eastern Europe 2002-2006 
 
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
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This finding is puzzling not only because it defies the expected pattern of competition, 
but also because the four countries which have rotated do not naturally coalesce in any of 
the groups outlined by the literature on party competition reviewed above. Estonia, 
Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia have rather different social structures, as well as diverse 
communist and transition experiences. This puzzle deepens even further when we 
consider the structure of political competition in the four non-EU Balkan countries 
covered by the CHES dataset. Figure 11 depicts the political space in Bosnia, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Serbia. Strikingly, only Serbia follows the expected Eastern European 
competition pattern. The economic left in Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia is generally 
more socially liberal than the right. The following section considers an explanation to this 
puzzle. 
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Figure 11 Political Space in Four Balkan Countries 
 
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
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Explaining Competition Structure in Eastern Europe 
 
The shift in political competition appears to be precipitated by a decline of the communist 
experience as the defining characteristic of Eastern European polities. After two decades 
of democratic politics, communism starts to recede in the historical background. This 
process may be slow and uneven, but it also appears ineluctable. As the impact of the 
communist experience diminishes, other, deeper historical experiences come to define 
political conflict in Eastern Europe.         
 
The Changing Meaning of the Socio-Cultural Dimension 
 
A witness to the withering significance of the communist experience is the changing 
meaning of the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe. A major impact of the 
communist heritage on Eastern European party competition is the bondage between left-
wing economics and authoritarian social views, opposed by right-wing economic 
reformism and liberal democratic opposition to communist power (Kitschelt 1992, 1995). 
The left-right, conservative-liberal space is thus expected to be positively correlated.  
 
The socio-cultural dimension is, however, defined in post-communist terms. It pertains to 
elementary civil liberties and democratic rights, such as freedom of speech, association 
and press, together with free and fair elections. In this domain the post-communist left is 
frequently tainted by its authoritarian past, while the right is made up of political forces 
opposing both communist social authoritarianism, together with its centrally planned 
economy.  
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However, as the communist experience becomes less salient, the meaning of the socio-
cultural dimension is redefined. In most Eastern European countries, elementary civil 
liberties and free and fair elections are a political reality taken for granted by parties and 
voters.28 These issues are no longer contested, as even unreformed communists accept 
basic democratic rules (interview with Vojtech Filip, leader of KSCM). Elementary civil 
liberties and democratic rights thus compose an ever smaller portion of what the socio-
cultural dimension of political competition in Eastern Europe is about.  
 
Figure 12 demonstrates the decreasing salience of freedom and democracy as reflected in 
Eastern European party manifestos. The figure depicts issues of freedom and democracy 
as a share of the socio-cultural dimension.29 While in the early 1990s concerns over 
freedom and democracy make up close to half of social issues in party manifestos, by the 
early 2000s this drops to around 20%. There is a significant trend -- depicted by a dashed 
line in the figure. 
                                                
28 The situation is different in some of the western Balkan countries, such as Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia, 
as well as in Eastern European countries beyond the scope of this paper, such as Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine. 
 
29 The socio-cultural dimension is conceived as including all issues coded as `Freedom and Democracy', 
`Fabric of Society' (nationalism, multiculturalism, moral conduct) and per501 (environment) in the 
Comparative Party Manifesto Data. 
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Figure 12 Freedom and Democracy as Share of Social Issues 
Comparative Manifesto Project Data 
 
The current structure of the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe is strikingly 
similar to that in the West. Table 6 shows that the socio-cultural dimension is dominated 
by three groups of issues in both regions of the continent. The first group, containing a 
number of salient issues, concerns cosmopolitanism versus nationalism. While the values 
associate with these issues correspond across the two regions, Eastern Europeans are 
more affected by domestic ethnic minorities, while Western Europeans are more 
influenced by immigration. The second group of issues pertains to secular modernism 
versus traditionalism. In both regions, it contains less salient issues concerning the role of 
religion in determining people's lifestyles. The final group of issues reflects international 
outlooks. It contains the single most salient issue in both regions -- European integration -
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- while in the East it is also concerns the role the United States play in international 
politics.30  
 
                                                
30 This analysis corresponds with the results presented by Rovny and Edwards (forthcoming). It is also 
consistent with most recent works on party competition in Western Europe (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008; 
Bornschier 2010). 
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Table 6 The Structure of the Socio-Cultural Dimension in Eastern Europe 
 
Principle factor analysis with varimax rotation. Salience of each issue assessed by experts on a 0-10 scale. 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006. 
 
 
Given the changing nature of the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe, the 
outstanding question is: what structures party competition as the significance of the 
communist authoritarian heritage wanes, and other more typically western concerns, such 
as nationalism v. cosmopolitanism or modern secularism v. traditionalism, come to play 
primary role in non-economic political discourse, orientation and decision-making?  
 
Historical Experiences and the Structure of Political Competition 
 
The receding role of the communist heritage leaves room for deeper historical 
experiences to define the contemporary political competition in Eastern Europe. These 
experiences determine the general frame of party contest by shaping the predominant 
political divides, and by connecting political outlooks into more or less coherent 
ideologies. In the sense of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work on party system 
formation in Western Europe, this paper suggests that a broad historical foundation of 
Eastern European politics underlies the strategic actions of political parties.31  
                                                
31 cf. Sitter 2002, Batory and Sitter 2004, Bakke and Sitter 2005, Rovny and Edwards forthcoming. 
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The most profound historical experience of Eastern European countries has been that of 
state and nation building. These experiences are likely to be more powerful than the 
impact of the communist regime. However, the communist regime is not independent 
from these factors. It has both stemmed from the pre-communist state and nation building 
legacy of some of these countries (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999), while the communist heritage 
has also intricately combined with these historical features in the post-communist 
aftermath (cf. Vachudova 2005). Nonetheless, the argument of this paper is that the 
experience of state and nation building is a central determinant of contemporary Eastern 
European party competition.   
 
The building of Eastern European states and the defining of Eastern European nations 
occurred over a span of 150 years, and thus under vastly different circumstances.32 The 
entire region was divided into four empires -- Austrian, Ottoman, Prussian/German and 
Russian -- for most of the 19th century, with none of the current Eastern European 
countries in existence. The process of Eastern European independence started in the 
1860s, but continued rather gradually over the next one and half century. Only with the 
independence of Montenegro and Kosovo in 2006 and 2008 respectively, does there 
appear to be no significant secessionist movement in the region. The circumstances and 
                                                
 
32 While in most cases national awakening movements preceded state formation (cf. Agnew 1993, Bradley 
1984, Brock 1973, Chlebowczyk 1980, Gellner 1983, Molenda 1991, Niederhauser 1982), I am interested 
in the connection between state formation and nation-building. 
 86 
logics under which state institutions were erected and national myths were (re)enforced 
are likely to significantly inform contemporary political outlooks.33  
 
Three components are likely to determine the nature of state and nation building in 
Eastern Europe, and thus frame political competition. These are 1) the level of economic 
development at the time of independence; 2) lost great power status; and 3) independence 
after communism.  
 
1) Level of Economic Development at Independence 
The level of economic development at the time of independence determines the social 
forces behind the construction of state institutions and the formation of national self-
conceptions. This is mostly salient for countries gaining independence prior to the rise of 
communism. A number of scholars suggests a connection between economic 
development, social structure and the nature of national movements (cf. Gellner 1983, 
Hroch 1985). Higher level of economic development at the time of independence is likely 
associated with the level of industrialization. More developed countries are then likely to 
have a middle class, connecting national independence with its economic aspirations. 
Also, more developed countries are likely to have some, at least somewhat organized, 
industrial working class. Under such circumstances state and national formation is 
influenced by classical liberal thought associated with the middle class, while the 
working class is influenced by marxist conceptions of proletarian internationalism. 
Consequently, such countries are more likely to develop market-oriented ideological 
outlooks, and their national views are likely to be more inclusive.  
                                                
33 On parallels between past and present nationalism in the region see Hroch (1996). 
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On the contrary, countries achieving independence at low levels of economic 
development tend to lack the middle class, as well as an industrial working class at the 
time of state and nation building. Their statehood develops in the context of paternalistic 
-- either aristocratic or ecclesiastical -- elites, who associate national interest with their 
political aims (Hroch 2001). State building in such context is rooted in traditional 
paternalism. There are few classical liberal influences, and thus limited drive towards 
market capitalism. Instead, these countries develop a tradition of populist etatism where 
protectionist, authoritative rule is connected with a traditional and nationalist ruling elite.  
 
2) Lost Great Power Status 
Although all countries of the region do not exist prior to the mid 19th century, Poland, 
Hungary, Serbia and Lithuania enjoyed rule over extensive territories in medieval and 
early modern times. This heritage fuels nationalist sentiments of historical grandeur and 
mission, associated with the aristocratic elites. However, the invariable loss of this great 
power status is perceived as national tragedy.34 In extreme cases, this loss is perceived as 
national martyrdom, leading to perpetuation of messianic national myths, declaring, for 
example, that ``... on the third day the soul shall return to the body, and the Nation shall 
arise and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery"(Mieckiewicz 1832 cited in Brock 
1973: 319).35 Lost great power status thus tends to reinforces the effect of traditionalistic 
                                                
34 The Czech Kingdom also enjoyed some medieval grandeur, but its heyday was relatively short -- 
spanning only the late Premyslid and the Luxembourg dynasties. Furthermore, most of the native Czech 
aristocracy was executed in the aftermath of the Bohemian campaign of the Thirty Years' War in 1621, 
leaving few natural heirs of the imperial past. 
 
35 Similar myths exist in other countries. Kossuth, the leader of Hungary's independence movement in 
1848-9, saw ``a besieged Hungarian nation which would disappear if it did not take the offensive to defend 
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and ethnic conceptions of statehood, strengthening a conservative nationalist pole of 
political competition.  
 
3) Independence After Communism 
A number of Eastern European countries do not achieve independent statehood until after 
the collapse of communism. The rise of these new countries results from more or less 
rapid disintegration of three communist federations: Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia. In the case of the Baltic republics, post-communist independence is 
preceded by interwar independence between 1918/1921 and 1940. In all cases, however, 
independence after communism is likely to affect the conception of statehood and 
nationhood, and consequently the character of political competition, in particular ways.  
 
In these countries, communism is largely perceived as a form of foreign domination from 
the federal center.36 Under such circumstances, the political left in the new state has an 
incentive to distance itself from communism, which embodies not only authoritarianism, 
but also national submission.  
 
Furthermore, the democratic opposition to the communist regime, `the right', is also the 
strongest advocate of independence, making it naturally more nationalist, if not explicitly 
separatist. In countries that had experienced higher levels of economic development in 
                                                
itself," while oppressing other national minorities (Longworth 1997: 132). The Serbian myth of Kosovo 
Polje portrays the Serbs as defenders of European Christendom (Clemens 2010). 
 
36 This is particularly acute in the Baltic states which were effectively occupied by the Red Army in 1940. 
However, even in Yugoslavia, the communist federation was dominated by the Serbs, who made up the 
conservative vanguard of the regime. This eventually led the Slovenes to walk out of a Communist party 
congress in 1990, precipitating the federal breakdown (Bebler 1993). 
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the past, this is connected with economic liberalism, thus making the nationalist, anti-
communist right also economically right-wing. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the historical experiences of Eastern European countries with respect 
to the three components discussed above. The column `economic development at 
independence' offers a qualitative assessment, ranking the countries on an ordinal scale 
from 1 (low development) to 4 (high development). GDP per capita at independence 
provides Maddison's (N.d.) measure of historical GDP at the time of independence or at 
the closest available date, reported in parentheses. `Lost great power status' and 
`independence after communism' are dummy variables. The index variable at the right 
side of table 7 is a sum of the ordinal `economic development at independence' variable, 
and the `lost great power status' and `independence after communism' dummies. The 
index thus ranges from 1 (low development, lost great power status, independence during 
communism) to 6 (high development, no lost great power status, independence after 
communism).  
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Table 7 Historical Experiences in Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
*1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (Maddison, n.d.).  
**Hungary considered independent since the `dualization' of Austria in 1867. 
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Countries scoring low on this index have developed their state structures and national 
self-conceptions in the context of traditional paternalistic elites. Their lost great power 
status fuels ethnic nationalist myths of grandeur, and the fact that they did not create a 
new state after communism removes an opportunity to break with the communist past. In 
these countries nationalism, economic populism and paternalism tend to coincide. They 
are thus likely to adhere to the original post-communist structure of political competition 
-- linking economic left with social conservatism -- longer. They are likely to be the 
laggards in the rotation of the competition axis to the western pattern. Countries scoring 
high on the index, on the other hand, are countries which formed their state institutions 
and national awareness in the context of some liberal influence of the middle classes. 
They have not experienced great power status in the past and thus are less likely to 
succumb to appeals of old national glory. The fact that some separated from communist 
federations gives them a specific opportunity to break with the communist past. In these 
countries the anti-communist right is influenced by its national separatism, as well as 
market capitalism, while the left is less burdened by the communist heritage. These 
countries are likely to spearhead the shift of competition structure from the post-
communist eastern pattern to that of the west. They are the first to connect left-wing 
economics with social liberalism. The following section tests these hypotheses.    
 
Analyzing Competition Change in Eastern Europe 
 
This section develops statistical models predicting the structure of political competition 
in Eastern Europe.  The dependent variable is the slope of the competition axis -- the 
best-fitting line depicted in the graphs in figures 9, 10 and 11. A positively sloping axis is 
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typical for the original post-communist party competition where economic left correlates 
with social conservatism. As the slope approaches zero, the social positions of the 
economic left and economic right coincide. When the slope is negative, the economic left 
is more socially liberal than the economic right, which is typical for western European 
countries. Thus clockwise rotation of the competition axis reflects social liberalization of 
the economic left combined with movement towards social conservatism on the right. 
 
The primary predictor of the competition slope argued for in this paper is the historical 
experience of state and nation building. This is summarized by the index developed in the 
previous section. However, since this index is based on qualitative assessment, three 
more objective predictors: 1) GDP per capita at independence (or closest year); 2) lost 
great power status; and 3) independence after communism, are used as additional proxies 
of historical state and nation building experiences. These predictors cannot be used in the 
same model due to their high collinearity.  
 
Given the very small number of observations (T*N=24), offering very limited number of 
degrees of freedom, the models need to be exceedingly simple. They, nonetheless, control 
for four key variables considered crucial for explaining post-communist party 
competition by the literature. First, the models control for ethnic fragmentation, measured 
by the ethnic fragmentation index (Fearon et al. 2007). Second, the models control for 
pre-World War II democratic experience, measured using the Polity IV database. I 
multiply each positive Polity IV score by the number of years the country received it. 
This captures not only the depth, but also the length of the democratic experience. Third, 
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the models control for the type of communist regime the country experienced. I follow 
Kitschelt (1995) and Kitschelt et al. (1999) and divide the countries as experiencing 
either bureaucratic-authoritarian, national or patrimonial communist regimes. Finally, the 
models control for post-communist transition legacy, which is proxied by the year in 
which a country obtained the highest Freedom House democratic score of `free.'37 
Countries which transitioned quickly and successfully achieved the status of `free' shortly 
after the collapse of communism, while those who struggled with their transition took a 
longer time.  
 
The data is a panel cross-section consisting of 14 units and two time periods.38 Most 
variables are time invariant. Since I am interested in variance between countries, rather 
than over-time, I employ a method advocated by Huber et al. (2009).39 I combine OLS 
estimation with robust cluster standard errors. This estimator remains valid in light of any 
pattern of correlation among errors within units. Since it is sensitive to error correlation 
between clusters -- possibly caused by omitted factors affecting the dependent variable 
across all units at the same time -- I ran all the models with a time period dummy 
variable. In all models this time-period dummy remained insignificant, suggesting no 
unmeasured time effects.   
                                                
37 Where a country relapsed to `partly free,' and then back to `free', the latest shift to `free' is considered. 
 
38 Only one time period is available for the non-EU countries. 
 
39 An alternative would be the Bartels-Mundlak model (Bartels 2008). This model distinguishes within and 
between variances, allowing the observation of both within and between effects. The down side of this 
model is that it effectively doubles the number of predictors in the model, using twice the degrees of 
freedom. Given my small sample size, this method is unfeasible. 
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Table 8 Predicting Competition Slope in Eastern Europe 
 
OLS regressions with robust cluster standard errors. Dependent variable is the competition axis slope (best-
fitting line) weighted by party vote.  Transition Legacy is proxied by the year when rated `Free' by Freedom 
House after communism. Bureaucratic communist regime is the baseline. 
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Table 8 summarizes the results, which support my hypotheses. The index of historical 
experience is highly statistically significant (despite the very small number of 
observations). Its negative coefficient suggests that the higher the index score, the more 
negative the competition axis -- as suggested by the theoretical propositions. One unit 
change on the index translates to 0.49 unit change of the competition axis slope, which 
translates to about 26° clockwise rotation.40 The other proxies of historical experience 
exhibit a similar effect. A $1000 change in GDP per capita at independence changes the 
competition slope by 0.17 units clockwise. Even more strikingly, having lost great power 
status reverses the shift of the competition axis slope in the western direction by 1.35 
units, which amounts to over a 50° 41 counterclockwise rotation. Similarly, gaining 
independence after communism shifts the competition axis slope by 1.3 units, that is over 
50° 42 clockwise rotation.43 Finally, all three models exhibit large R2 measures. The first 
and third model, based on the index of historical experience and lost great power status 
capture almost 55% of the dependent variable variance. 
 
Discussion 
 
Countries which have experienced higher levels of development at the time of state and 
nation building, countries which have not had any great power status to lose, as well as 
countries which have separated from communist federations after 1989, are more likely 
to converge on a western pattern of political competition, connecting the economic left 
                                                
40 tan-1(0.49)=26.1 
 
41 tan-1(1.35)=53.5° 
 
42 tan-1(1.3)=52.4° 
 
43 The fact that this effect is only significant at the 0.1 level is acceptable, given the very small number of 
degrees of freedom. 
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with social liberalism. This section considers four sets of cases assessing the particular 
connection between historical development and party competition change.  
 
1) The Czech Republic 
 
The first set of countries would be made up of two cases -- the Czech Republic and the 
German Democratic Republic -- had the latter not exited Eastern Europe through its 
unification with West Germany. Both countries experience relatively early 
industrialization, connected with the development of a significant middle class. In the 
Czech case, the national revival movement of the 19th century is explicitly bourgeois, 
centered around secular middle-class intellectuals and their salon culture (Hroch 1999, 
Longworth 1997: 136), which stands in stark contrast to the aristocratic or clerical 
national movements elsewhere. The Czech lands, just like Germany, develop a strong 
domestic workers' movement, whose organization dates back to the 19th century. The 
repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian communist regime eventually depends on Moscow's 
backing, and when this is removed by Gorbatchov, the regime implodes. The liberal 
middle-class heritage gives way to a competitive political system centered on an 
economic redistributive cleavage, with a liberal market-oriented right opposing the 
communist authoritarian left (Markowski 1997, Hanely 2004).  
 
The shift in the meaning of the socio-cultural dimension is precipitated by the increased 
salience of European integration. The European issue redefines the socio-cultural 
dimension in the Czech Republic as consisting primarily of the cosmopolitan versus 
nationalist divide. In this new context, the Czech hitherto liberal right starts employing 
national, Eurosceptic rhetoric, starting its slow turn towards social conservatism. Given 
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its historical development, the Czech system is, however, not endowed with paternalistic 
national sentiments, and so the nationalist rhetoric is rather reminiscent of the British 
Tories. On the left, the CSSD adopts pro-European more socially liberal positions typical 
for social democrats, while the unreformed communist KSCM remains skeptical. 
Although unrepentant, KSCM cannot be described as a socially conservative party in the 
new political context. Its historical commitment to internationalist working-class 
ideology leads it towards a modern radical left platform based on egalitarianism and anti-
globalism. Of ten interviewed party leaders and staff members from all Czech 
parliamentary parties, nine consider KSCM as socially liberal (Cizinsky 2009; Drabek 
2009; Filip 2009; Kupka 2009; Luzar 2009; Mach 2009; Prusa 2009; Rybar 2009; Schon 
2009; Zaoralek 2009). The chairman of KSCM and his deputy independently place 
KSCM as the most socially liberal party in the Czech system. KSCM thus seems to 
follow the path of the German PDS (Die Linke) which shifted from ossified communism 
to a western style, radical left protest party (Segert 2002).44  
 
2) Poland and Hungary 
Poland and Hungary did not enjoy the same level of industrialization in the 19th century 
as the Czech lands. Though largely agrarian, a number of industrial centers, such as 
Budapest and Lodz, developed. The national elite is, however, of aristocratic lineage, 
reminiscent of the historical grandeur of the Polish Commonwealth or the Kingdom of 
Hungary. This sense of national traditionalism is coupled with Catholicism to create a 
strong religious-nationalist ideological pole. The communist regime imposed by Soviet 
                                                
44 Preliminary results from the 2010 CHES survey strongly support the claims that the Czech party system 
is also rotating. 
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troops is allowed to adopt national specifics, leading to controlled political and economic 
liberalization after 1970s (Kitschelt 1995). The domestic communist elites, detached from 
Moscow and its propaganda, are rather ``ideological pagans [than] communists" (Bozoki 
2002: 96). Seeing themselves as pragmatic problem-solvers, they negotiate liberalization 
and democratization with the communist opposition during the late 1980s.  
 
Given the traditional national-religious heritage in Poland and Hungary, the majority of 
the communist opposition turns towards Christian nationalism. The peculiarity of these 
two cases is that there is no economic right at all. Economic liberalization is taken up by 
the reforming pragmatic ex-communists (SLD and MSzP), but these parties are 
decisively leftist -- Mitterrandian or pre-Blairite -- drawing on socially liberal, 
moderately educated, secular, urban voters (Bozoki 2002, Markowski 2002). The `right' 
adopts Christian national populism, which places it to the left of the ex-communists, but 
on the conservative side of the social divide. This situation is altered in Poland in 2001, 
when the economic right-wing, social conservative Platforma Obywatelska succeeds in 
parliamentary elections. In Hungary, the `right'-wing Fidesz remains a populist 
nationalist alternative to MSzP.  
 
3) Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia 
Though geographically separate, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia exhibit a number 
of common characteristics. They experience medium to moderately high levels of 
development. Clemens (2010) emphasizes the role of early self-organization associated 
with a merchant middle class in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, coupled with a history of 
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tolerance in the two Baltic countries, rooted in their Hanseatic heritage, the legacy of 
liberal Swedish rule, and early abolition of serfdom under tsarist Russia. Croatia and 
Slovenia enjoy a politically and economically open Yugoslav communist regime, which 
gives them a taste of small-scale market capitalism, while massive emigration 
(particularly from Croatia) creates a connection with the west (Pickering and Baskin 
2008). Although Soviet communism is far more stringent, the Baltic countries profit from 
the liberal atmosphere of perestroika, developing national independence movements 
seeking to negotiate with the communist elite prior to 1989 (Kitschelt 1995). 
  
All four countries have broken out of a communist federation after 1989. The Croats and 
Slovenes walked out of the Yugoslav communist congress in 1990, which precipitated 
the demise of the federation (Pickering and Baskin 2008). In the Baltic states, the Singing 
Revolution eventually led to declaration of independence by the Supreme Soviets of the 
two republics in 1991. The separation process, connected with the heritage of moderate 
historical development, produces two consequences. First, the left-wing parties are able 
to (at least partially) detach themselves from the communist legacy, associated with the 
federal center, and adopt socially liberal stances in the face of nationalism. In the Balkan 
countries, entangled in ethnic war, the left retains a multi-ethnic character. In 1990, only 
52% of the Croatian SDP members are ethnic Croats, and during the war, the SDP 
provides a social democratic option for an electorate which does not prioritize ethnicity 
or religion (Pickering and Baskin 2008). In Slovenia, the left begins to cooperate with the 
Socialist International and swiftly emulates the ideological positions of the Party of 
European Socialists (Krasovec and Lajh 2009). In both Balkan countries, the left is 
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supported by the young, educated and urban populations (Jou 2010). In the Baltic 
countries, the left champions Slavic minority rights, which turns it towards social 
liberalism on the cosmopolitan-nationalist divide. Second, the right in these countries 
combines anti-communism with separatist nationalism. With the exception of Croatia, 
where the process is delayed, these positions are coupled with right-wing economics 
thanks to the history of moderate economic development and the earlier existence of a 
middle class (cf. Bunce 2003: 173).  
 
4) Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia 
The historical experience of Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia combines economic 
underdevelopment with early independence and state-building. The three countries are 
the first states in the region to gain full independence, emerging from the rubble of the 
declining Ottoman Empire in the mid to late 19th century. Longworth (1997: 137-41) 
notes the contrast between the intransigence of the aristocratic Boiar class and the vast 
and impoverished peasantry. State construction, he adds, is thus carried out under limited 
development, where ``dread of commercial enterprise" leads the privileged classes to 
proliferate officialdom, and flock to the civil service or the military whose opulence 
becomes an unsupportable financial burden on the new states (ibid: 140).45 There are too 
few workers to be mobilized, left-wing intellectualism is nonexistent (Mungiu-Pippidi 
2002), and thus paternalistic nationalism pervades.  
The communist regimes in these states take on a patrimonial, rather than working-class, 
character. Communist industrialization is coupled with highly personalized political style 
of the communist elites, reaching its apex in Causescu's Romania (Mingiu-Pippidi 2002). 
                                                
45 Bulgaria and Serbia in fact go bankrupt prior to the First World War. 
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With weak and fragmented communist opposition, partial democratization is carried out 
by the communists from above, without the severing of old-time patronage networks 
(Ziblatt and Biziouras 2002). To legitimize their continued rule, left-wing ex-communists 
rekindle paternalistic, ethnic nationalism (Ishiyama 1998, Ishiyama and Bozoki 2002, 
Brankovic 2002, Vachudova 2005, Pop-Eleches 2008). The left thus remains weighed 
down by authoritarian nationalist outlooks, while the right opposes these positions.  
 
Slovakia is a unique case. Its historical development is determined by its agrarian and 
largely Catholic character, dominated by domestic clerical elites. Its industrialization 
comes relatively late and its working class is minimal. This points to a heritage of 
paternalistic, populist nationalism, which is indeed revived by Tiso's clero-fascist 
dictatorship between 1939 and 1945. Slovakia shares its communist regime and early 
transition with the Czech Republic, but in 1993 it separates from Czechoslovakia. Slovak 
independence is spearheaded by the populist-nationalist HZDS, combining left-wing 
economics with social conservatism. Slovakia's position in the Czechoslovak federation 
allows the Slovak ex-communist SDL to break with communism, and adopt social 
democratic leanings -- following the Slovenian pattern. By 1994, SDL opposes HZDS 
nationalism and populism, and cooperates with the liberal right to oust HZDS from office 
(Fisher 2002). The association with the right, however, causes SDL to lose the 1994 
elections, which establishes HZDS as the primary left-wing conservative force in the 
country, galvanizing the liberal right-wing opposition46 -- a pattern more typical for the 
eastern Balkan cases. Only with the decline of HZDS and the rise of only mildly 
nationalist left-wing SMER after 2000, does Slovakia come to resemble the Czech case. 
                                                
46 See Vachudova (2005) for the role of the EU in this process. 
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This is again broken by SMER's social conservatism and the rise of the small, liberal 
right SaS in 2010. Slovakia is thus continuously pulled by its heritage of populist 
nationalism.    
 
Figure 13 summarizes the four patterns of political competition in Eastern Europe. The 
Czech case, as well as those of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, shows convergence 
on the western structure of party competition. The Hungarian and Polish pattern 
converges only if a major right-wing force adopts right-wing economic positions. This 
seems to be the case only in Poland, but not in Hungary. The Bulgarian, Romanian and 
Serbian pattern is likely to follow the traditional eastern competition structure for the 
foreseeable future.  
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Figure 13 Four Patterns of Eastern European Party Competition 
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Conclusion 
 
Eastern European politics have been considered as significantly different from those of 
western European countries. Eastern European party systems are expected to be either 
fluid and unstructured, or -- should structure arise -- to combine ideological views in 
opposite ways than the party systems in the West. The empirical evidence presented in 
this paper suggests that Eastern European party competition is both structured and 
converging on western ideological patterns. Although most Eastern European party 
systems combined left-wing economics with social conservatism in the past, this is no 
longer the case.  
 
This paper presents two explanations. First, it demonstrates that the meaning of the non-
economic, socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe has changed. No longer dominated 
by concerns over democratic rights and elementary civil liberties, more typically western 
issues of cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and secular modernism versus 
traditionalism prevail to define the socio-cultural dimension in Eastern Europe. Second, 
under these changing political conditions, deeper historical characteristics of Eastern 
European societies come forward to frame political competition. This paper emphasizes 
the role of historical experiences connected with state and nation building as the 
predictors of contemporary structure of political competition. Where early development 
aids the rise of a middle class and worker organizations, limiting the impact of 
aristocratic or ecclesiastical elites; populist, paternalistic nationalism is more likely 
curtailed. Right-wing politics tend to be infused with a market-oriented heritage, while 
the left-wing has an internationalist legacy to draw on. Furthermore, countries that gain 
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independence from communist federations after 1989 are likely to combine communist 
opposition with right-wing nationalism, while their left-wing parties have an opportunity 
to distance themselves from the communist past and adopt western social democratic 
views.  
 
Eastern Europe remains particular. Its parties are not deeply entrenched; their partisan 
apparatuses less developed; the political elites less socialized and experienced; corruption 
and patronage more widespread. However, as the communist experience settles into the 
crevices of history, the communist ideological bondage between left-wing economics and 
social conservatism gives way to deeper historical divides, which frame a number of 
eastern party systems in western patterns of party competition.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 9 Dimensional Structure of Used Datasets 
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Table 10 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Vote Choice 
 
 
Results for MNL model predicting vote choice for Major Right, Major Left and Radical Right. Estimated 
using Stata 11.1. Small-Hsiao test supports the presence of IIA. Data: 2006 European Social Survey. 
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Table 11 List of Party Types 
Major Right 
Austria Osterreichische Volkspartei OVP 
Belgium Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams CD&V 
Belgium Centre Democrate Humaniste CDH 
Belgium Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten VLD 
Britain Conservative Party Cons 
Denmark Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti V 
Finland Suomen Keskusta KESK 
Finland Kansallinen Kokoomus KOK 
France Union pour un Mouvement Populaire UMP 
Germany Christlich-Demokratische Union CDU 
Greece Nea Dimokratia ND 
Ireland Fianna Fail FF 
Ireland Fine Gael FG 
Italy Forza Italia FI 
Netherlands Christen-Democratisch Appel CDA 
Portugal Partido Popular Democratico/Partido Social Democrata PPD/PSD 
Spain Partido Popular PP 
Sweden Moderaterna M 
   
Major Left 
Austria Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs SPO 
Belgium Parti Socialiste PS 
Belgium Socialistische Partij Anders - Spirit SPA 
Britain Labour Party Lab 
Denmark Socialdemokraterne SD 
Finland Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen SDP 
France Parti Socialiste PS 
Germany Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPD 
Greece Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima PASOK 
Ireland Labour Lab 
Italy Democratici di Sinistra DS 
Netherlands Partij van de Arbeid PvdA 
Portugal Partido Socialista PS 
Spain Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol PSOE 
Sweden Arbetarpartiet - Socialdemokraterna SAP 
   
Radical Right 
Austria Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich BZO 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs FPO 
Belgium Vlaams Belang VB 
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti DF 
Finland Persussuomalaiset True Finns 
France Front National FN 
France Mouvement Pour la France MPF 
Greece Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos LAOS 
Italy Alleanza Nazionale AN 
Italy Lega Nord LN 
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Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn LPF 
Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV 
   
Radical Left 
Denmark Enhedslisten EL 
Denmark Socialistisk Folkeparti SF 
Finland Vasemmistoliito VAS 
France Parti Communiste Francais PCF 
Germany Die Linkspartei - Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus Linke/ PDS 
Greece Dimokratiko Kinoniko Kinima DIKKI 
Greece Kommunistiko Komma Elladas KKE 
Greece Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis Aristeras SYRIZA 
Italy Partito dei Comunisti Italiani PdCI 
Italy Rifondazione Comunista RC 
Netherlands Socialistische Partij SP 
Portugal Bloco de Esquerda BE 
Portugal Coligacao Democratica Unitaria CDU 
Spain Izquierda Unida IU 
Sweden Vaensterpartiet V 
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